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I N T R O D U C T I O N              
 
Political devolution, in the form of state disintegration and newly emergent borders, was a powerful 
force in the 1990s.  Beginning with the abrupt collapse of centralized political control in the Soviet 
Union, Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia, the trend continues in such distant locations as Quebec, 
Kashmir and East Timor.  The era also saw the normalization of trade relations between Western 
and Eastern Europe with the end of the Cold War, as well as the deepening integration of Western 
Europe.  The increasing liberalization of trade and rising popularity of economic integration seem 
to be diminishing the importance of political boundaries for many free-market democracies.  The 
nations of Eastern Europe were in a highly transitional period during this time, which led to 
significant restructuring of trade relationships—including the diminishing intensity and importance 
of their economic ties with former economic union members. 
  
Neoclassical economic theory states that market integration is rational because firms are 
able enjoy economies of scale and achieve greater levels of efficiency.  Economic integration also 
rationalizes the production of goods and services and ultimately provides for a higher average 
standard of living and greater welfare in the long run due to increased levels of trade.  Despite this 
economic rationale, many economic unions are splintering, although some try to maintain some of 
the benefits of integration.  This paper will explore the costs of economic disintegration and its 
impact on trade patterns and intensity throughout Eastern Europe, looking at both the 
macroeconomic and firm level.  This is the logical way to measure the effects of disintegration as 
trade is one of the main channels for the realization of the gains from economic integration.  This 
paper aims to determine how businesses are coping with the erection of new borders, and the 
possible policy alternatives that could mitigate any resulting negative impacts.   
 
While the level of trade flows has been measured for the former constituent members of the 
Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia by other researchers, this has been very difficult to carry out in 
Yugoslavia due to the lack of reliable data (except between Croatia and Slovenia).  Further, the 
military conflict involvement and simultaneous transition to a free-market economy also 
complicate the picture.  The case of Croatia is therefore given special attention in order to 
determine how the forces of disintegration have influenced individual firms.  The difficulty of 
determining the specific effects of disintegration by evaluating economic data (which is largely 
unavailable) makes a qualitative study the optimal approach to this question.  Managers of large 
firms were key informants in order to best discern the impact of the economic fragmentation on 
their organizations.  The study will help determine if businesses have had to find new sources of   6
inputs or different markets for their goods since independence and also how their workers were 
affected.  Considering the limited amount of research on this subject, particularly at the 
microeconomic level, it is important to note that this is an exploratory project. 
 
This research model is subject to bias in many ways since this topic addresses sensitive 
issues of the war, as well as income, which many people may feel uncomfortable discussing 
openly.  People are also reluctant to speak negatively about Croatia’s status as an independent 
nation, even if they believe their living standards or business conditions were better before 
disintegration, for fear of sounding unpatriotic.  There may be additional cultural issues that I am 
unaware of that have affected this analysis.  The strategy of snowball sampling could have easily 
resulted in informants with similar backgrounds, experiences and thoughts on certain topics.  
However, this approach seems the most effective and feasible given time, language, and budget 
constraints.  The firms interviewed did represent different sectors, giving a broader significance to 
the results.  It is also important to note that the firms interviewed were only the successful ones.  
Many other firms have closed in the wake of Yugoslav disintegration, so the sample is not entirely 
representative. 
 
This paper is divided into three parts.  Part One reviews the literature on economic 
integration theory and on empirical studies of the effects of economic integration in the European 
Union.  Part Two acknowledges what limited research has been done on economic disintegration 
and reviews the literature on the cases of the Council for Mutual Economic Aid, the Soviet Union, 
Czechoslovakia, and Yugoslavia.  Special attention was given to this final case, in which firm 
managers were interviewed to determine the specific effects of disintegration on businesses in 
Croatia.  The paper culminates in Part Three with some general lessons about disintegration and 








PART  ONE:  ECONOMIC  INTEGRATION         
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THOUGHT ON ECONOMIC INTEGRATION 
At the core of the idea of economic integration lies trade—the movement of goods, services, as 
well as people and capital across borders.  The notion that trade is beneficial has been around at 
least since Adam Smith argued in The Wealth of Nations (1776) that a nation will trade when it has 
an absolute, or competitive, advantage in the production of a good.  (That is, when the nation can 
produce the commodity cheaper than its trading partner.)  International trade allows a firm to 
expand its market size so that it can reap the benefits of internal economies of scale.  In 1817 David 
Ricardo reasoned that even if a nation has an absolute cost advantage in the production of all goods, 
it might still trade with others based on differences in relative internal economic capabilities.  “A 
country has a comparative advantage for the purposes of trade in those commodities which its 
industry produces most cost effectively relative to other commodities” (Malizia and Feser, 1999, p. 
153).  In sum, international trade is not necessarily about competition, but rather about mutually 
beneficial exchange (Jovanović, 1998, p. 3).   
Economic integration rationalizes the  
production of goods and services and  
ultimately provides a higher average  
standard of living and greater welfare in 
the future. However, the benefits of  
integration come in the long run, after a  
brief adjustment period, but are greater  
than the possible short-run costs (ibid). 
 
Many economists argue that  
international economic integration is a  
particularly desirable strategy for small and  
medium-sized countries.  In theory, large and developed countries such as the United States have a 
diversified economy, which allows them to follow autarchic economic policies.  However, small 
countries, such as Croatia, are more dependent on external relations, so an autarchic policy is not 
economically rational for them in the long-term.  Integration can serve as a reliable ‘insurance 
policy’ against sudden changes in the trading behavior of partner countries that they are highly 
dependent on.  Such a policy would also provide an increase in business predictability, which has a 
potentially positive impact on domestic and foreign investment (ibid, p.1).  Further, “the efficient 
operation of many modern technologies requires secure access to the widest market which does not 
exist in small, and sometimes medium-sized countries” (ibid, p. 3).  Access to a larger market also 
The benefits of integration include: 
•  Enhanced efficiency in production made possible 
by increased specialization in accordance with the 
law of comparative advantage; 
•  Increased production levels due to better 
exploitation of economies of scale made possible 
by the increased size of the market; 
•  An improved international bargaining position, 
made possible by the larger size, leading to better 
terms of trade; 
•  Enforced changes in efficiency brought about by 
enhanced competition; 
•  Changes affecting both amount and quality of the 
factors of production due to technological 
advances, i.e. changes in the rate of growth.  (El-
Agraa, 1989, p. 344)  
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allows firms to gain economies of scale benefits, as well as a stronger international bargaining 
position on the terms of trade.   
 
Economic integration itself, and not just trade, was not mentioned in the literature on the 
economic interrelationship between states until the 1940s.  Viner was the first to lay the foundation 
for the theory of customs unions (1950), which represented the core of the traditional theory of 
international economic integration (Jovanović, p. 5).  The concept evolved over the ensuing 
decades after much debate over the definition and what exactly was to be integrated.  Tinbergen 
(1954) offered one of the first definitions of integration, maintaining that there are two parts to 
integration.  Negative integration is the removal of discriminatory and restrictive institutions and 
the introduction of freedom for economic transactions, such as the removal of tariffs and quotas.  
Positive integration is the adjustment of existing policies and the establishment of new policies and 
institutions endowed with coercive powers, such as the introduction of common economic policies 
(ibid, p. 5).  History has shown that negative integration is the easier of the two and is therefore 
generally the first step in increasing ties between nations, since positive integration infringes upon 
sensitive issues of national sovereignty.  Most economic theorists agree that economic integration is 
a process by which a group of countries strives to increase its level of welfare through a weak or 
strong partnership between themselves and that this involves at least some division of labor and 
freedom of movement for goods and services within the group (ibid, p. 9). 
 
  There are five key theoretical types of economic integration, which are summarized in Table 
A.  These types vary according to the degree or depth of integration they attain. These distinctions 
are an attempt to answer the question about what exactly is to be integrated—citizens, markets, 
production, consumption, commodities, services, regions, factors, money, resources, etc.  
Jovanović describes the main attributes of each type:   
  
•  Free Trade Area: An agreement among countries about the elimination of all tariff and 
quantitative restrictions on mutual trade.  Every country in this area retains its own tariff and 
other regulation of trade with third countries.  Usually has rules preventing trade deflection (the 
import of goods from a third country to country A which has a relatively lower tariff, and then 
re-exporting to partner country B).  Free trade areas must address the problem of production 
deflection, which occurs if the production of goods that contain imported inputs is shifted to 
countries that have lower tariffs if the difference in tariffs offsets the difference in production 
costs. 
 
•  Customs Union:  Participating countries not only remove tariff and quantitative restrictions on 
their internal trade, but also introduce a common external tariff on trade with third countries.  
The participating countries take part in international negotiations about trade and tariffs as a   9
single entity.  
 
•  Common Market:  In addition to the requirements for a customs union, there is free mobility 
for the factors of production.  Common regulations (restrictions) on the movement of factors 
with third countries are introduced.  
 
•  Economic Union:  Assumes a common market and harmonization of monetary, fiscal (taxation 
and budgetary issues), industrial, transportation and regional policies. 
 
•  Total Economic Union:  Consists of a union with a single economic policy and a supranational 
government with great economic authority.  There are no administrative barriers to the 













EMPIRICAL STUDIES OF ECONOMIC INTEGRATION 
 
The European Union     
The European Union (EU) is the largest and most recent  
example of economic integration.  It consists of fifteen  
independent states in Western Europe and was founded  
to enhance political, economic and social co-operation.   
(See Table B for a list of EU members and their population.)   
The EU was founded on November 1, 1993, and three  
new members (Austria, Finland, and Sweden) have  
joined since January 1, 1995.  The EU’s predecessor, the  
European Economic Community (EEC), was established  
in 1957 upon the signing of the Treaty of Rome.  The  
founding members included France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, Belgium, the 
Netherlands and Luxembourg.  In 1973 the United Kingdom, Ireland and Denmark joined.  
Table B. EU Countries and 
Population 
Country  Population 
(2000) 
     Austria   8.1 million
     Belgium   10.2 million
     Denmark   5.3 million
     Finland   5.2 million
     France   59.3 million
     Germany   82.8 million
     Greece   10.6 million
     Ireland   3.8 million
     Italy   57.6 million
     Luxembourg   .4 million
     Netherlands   15.9 million
     Portugal   10.0 million
     Spain   40.0 million
     Sweden   8.9 million
     United Kingdom  59.5 million
Source: CIA World Factbook 
Table A. Types of International Economic Integration 











Removal of tariffs 
and quotas 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Common external 
tariff 
No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Factor Mobility 
 
No  No Yes Yes Yes 
Harmonization of 
economic policies 
No No No Yes  Yes 
Total unification of 
economic policies 
No No No No Yes 
Source: Jovanović  10
Economic integration was used after World War II to realize political goals, chiefly to anchor West 
Germany within the Western European alliance.  Indeed, from the outset, the agenda of the EC 
included the idea of fostering political community through socio-economic integration, clearly 
demarcating it from other economic unions such as the North American Free Trade Agreement 
(Werner, 1996).  Since World War II, the concept of cooperation has rapidly gained ground in 
Europe, calling for the reduction of economic disparities between regions and greater social 




Before this arrangement, European currencies were not convertible and domestic trade was highly 
protected.  Intra-European trade was based on bilateral clearing arrangements institutionalized by 
the European Payments Union (McCauley, Sawyer, and Arestis, 1996).  Since that time, the 
economies of member states have slowly integrated.  By the end of the 1968, the customs union 
was completed—all import tariffs were removed, accomplishing Tinbergen’s negative integration.  
Table C shows that reciprocal trade between EC countries has constantly increased during this 
period.  From 1960 to 1973 the trade between the six founding countries increased from 35 to 50%, 
in terms of the share of overall trade.  Trade then stagnated until the mid 1980s, prompting steps 















Table C. Trade of EC Economies, 1960-90 (Figures for world trade is given as a % of GDP. 
Intra-EC trade is given as a % of total trade.  For the Member States, figures for world trade as a 
% of GDP include intra-Community trade; for EC-12, intra-Community trade has been excluded.) 
 













37.5 64.8 42.8 71.2 48.9 71.2 61.5 67.0 60.8 71.7 
Denmark  27.0 52.3 23.4 46.7 25.3 48.2 29.1 49.1 26.7 50.8 
Germany  15.9 44.8 17.6 50.9 20.4 50.3 24.8 50.5 24.9 53.1 
Greece  12.7 50.6 12.7 53.4 17.6 47.3 19.5 48.1 20.8 60.5 
Spain 8.1  47.8  9.2  44.4  11.2 41.3 14.4 39.3 14.4 56.0 
France  11.0 45.8 12.5 57.2 16.6 55.0 18.9 53.9 18.6 61.9 
Ireland  33.6 72.2 35.3 71.6 45.8 74.3 50.1 73.1 52.0 72.2 
Italy  11.7 42.9 13.1 49.5 18.4 48.7 19.4 46.1 16.9 55.0 
Netherlands  37.7 62.7 36.4 67.8 40.6 65.9 47.8 64.1 49.0 67.8 
Portugal  19.8 48.3 20.3 49.6 22.2 50.2 30.1 50.1 32.5 65.1 
United 
Kingdom 
16.0 26.7 16.7 31.2 22.3 37.9 21.6 44.1 21.0 49.9 
EC-12  8.8  45.0 8.3  51.9 10.2 52.6 11.5 52.2 9.8  59.8 
Source: Eurostat and Tsoulakis (1993) (in Werner, 1996)   11
By the 1980s the expected benefits of the EEC had not fully materialized and new steps 
were decided on towards positive integration (Cecchini, 1988).  Thus, the Internal Market Program 
(IMP) was launched by the Single European Act in 1986 to establish an area without internal 
frontiers, creating an area in which the circulation of goods, services, capital and labor is 
unimpeded.  The significant non-tariff barriers to trade that remained, including varying technical 
standards for goods and different currency regulations for movements of capital, had inhibited 
integration from producing the desired levels of trade and economic growth (Werner, 1996).  The 
EC Commission aimed to overcome these barriers with the aim of establishing the Single European 
Market in 1993.  It required the harmonization of Community-wide policies, such as uniform trade 
and competition policies, standards and technical rules, as well as the facilitation of intra-
Community mobility by promoting the mutual recognition of qualifications (ibid).  The result was 
the formation of Jovanović’s economic union. 
 
Currently, EU currencies are fully convertible.  Capital controls, intra-EU tariffs and quotas 
have been eliminated (McCauley, Sawyer, and Arestis, 1996).  The path of monetary union has 
gone through a number of stages that ultimately culminated in the Maastricht Treaty that laid out a 
precise path and timetable for economic and monetary union.  The common currency was adopted 
on January 1, 1999 and will be used by 12 of the member countries on January 1, 2002, further 
facilitating cross-border transactions and reducing costs.  However, the United Kingdom, Sweden 
and Denmark are slow to surrender their national currency because of the lack of control over 
monetary policy this would entail and also because it remains a powerful national symbol to some. 
 
There were significant expectations of the benefits of the deepening integration.  Many 
recent studies have attempted to determine if these results have materialized.  A 1996 report on 
price competition and price convergence conducted an analysis of the overall trends in price 
dispersion in the EU.  It found that, as expected, prices had tended to converge across the EU.  
There has been a general trend towards price convergence in the EU-12 (the original 12 members, 
before Sweden, Denmark and Austria joined) over the period 1980 to 1993 and this process prices 
has actually accelerated following the launch of the IMP (NTUA, CES and Middlesex University, 
1996).  The tendency for prices to converge has been comparatively greater in the three member 
states (Greece, Portugal and Spain) which joined the EC later than those in the EU-9, reflecting a 
“catch-up” effect of integration (ibid).  
   12
Table C shows that reciprocal trade between EC countries rose to 60% of the total amount 
by 1992, likely because of the increased integration efforts to facilitate trade.  However, other 
researchers have determined, using the gravity model
1, that the formation of free trade areas in 
Western Europe has had only a “moderate positive effect on trade flows” (Fidrmuc and Fidrmuc, 
2000, p. 15).  Nevertheless, they assert that this should  
not be interpreted as evidence of failure of EU  
integration, but is more likely a reflection of the  
ongoing process of global liberalization, which reduces  
the relative advantage of regional integration (ibid).   
 
Additional studies have also noted that the  
nations of the EU saw improved economic conditions  
as the integration was deepened and trade increased,  
although perhaps not much above the normal level,
2 as  
found by Fidrmuc and Fidrmuc.  In a European  
Commission white paper, the authors attempted to  
quantify the effects of all the measures designed to  
bring about a single market, noting that on average,  
econometric calculations show that the contribution  
of integration to economic growth has accounted for  
around 0.4 % of GDP per year in the period 1986 to  
1992 (European Commission, 1993).  Most European  
economies experienced an enhanced performance  
relative to the U.S. and Japan in the post-1987  
period compared with the 1975 to 1987 experience  
(Fingleton, Lewney and Pinelli, 1996).  
 
The poorest countries to join the EU to date  
have been Italy (1957), Ireland (1973), Greece (1981),  
Spain (1986) and Portugal (1986).  Initially each of  
these additions caused fears of mass migrations in the  
wealthier countries, but these proved to be unfounded,  
                                                             
1 The gravity model of trade relates bilateral trade between two countries to the distance between them and their 
economic sizes proxied usually by their gross outputs.  It is also able to control for other factors affecting trade, such as 
business cycle effects, price level changes and global trade development. 
Table D. Comparison of Growth 
Rates in Ireland in Greece and  
GDP per Capita (PPP) in the EU 
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as the economic situations improved in them.  Of these countries, Ireland stands out as a 
remarkable success story.  In the early 1970s, just before joining the then EEC, Ireland’s GDP per 
capita, adjusted for purchasing power parity, was only 61% of the EU-15 average; by 1990 it had 
reached 73%, and it is currently at 115% of the average, ranking third in the EU (see Table D) (The 
Economist, May 19-25 2001).  In just 30 years the country overtook the majority of EU countries.  
However, Ireland’s economic boom is not due just to EU membership, as comparison with the 
other countries indicates.  Greece joined the EEC with an income level of 69% of the community 
average, but this level has actually dropped to 67% (although in absolute terms the country is much 
better off) (ibid).  Table D shows the dramatic differences in their growth rates after EU accession.  
Spain and Portugal have narrowed the gap with the EU average, but are still far below.  Part of the 
Irish success story can be explained by the country’s good use of EU aid, ensuring that it was well-
administered and went into infrastructure projects of lasting value (ibid).  They also attracted many 
foreign investors who wanted to take advantage of the single market by cutting bureaucracy and 
corporate taxes.  This indicates that integration alone will not lead to total convergence.  Transfer 
payments and their effective use are also necessary to narrow the gap.  The Economist also 
observed that Greece apart, the history of the EU since 1957 suggests that member states’ income 
levels do gradually converge, although some will always be higher than others. 
 
There is additional evidence of a trend of convergence.  The largest improvements in 
performance relative to the U.S. and Japan in the post-1987 period compared with the 1975 to 1987 
period were in the worst-off countries (referred to as Objective 1), with the exception of Greece and 
southern Italy (Fingleton, Lewney and Pinelli, 1996).  This again demonstrates the “catch-up” 
effect for most lagging regions.  In the post-1987 period gross value added (GVA) per capita in 
Objective 1 and peripheral regions grew faster than over the period 1975 to 1987 (ibid).  This 
contrasts with the growth in the better-off countries and non-peripheral regions, which was slower 
after 1987 than before.  GVA per capita in Objective 2 (the next-to-worst) regions grew more 
slowly than in other regions, before and after the IMP (ibid).  Border regions, which tended to grow 
slightly faster than interior regions prior to the IMP, increased their growth advantage after 1987, 
compared with interior regions, where growth slowed noticeably (ibid).  Analysis of employment 
growth also shows that the worst-off, peripheral and border regions appear to have improved their 
position relative to the other regions in the post-1987 period with respect to the pre-1987 period.  
Regions specialized in manufacturing appear to have outperformed the other regions in the post-
1987 period with respect to both GVA per capita and employment growth (ibid).  This all indicates 
                                                                                                                                                                                                      
2 The normal level is the level predicted by the gravity model.   14
the significant advantages of integration and the “catch-up” effect that prompts growth in the 
poorer regions. 
 
However, measures of inequality and clustering give an overall impression of a significant 
and enduring contrast between the richer core and poorer peripheral regions.  Nonetheless, there is 
some indication of a trend towards lower inequality and lower clustering, but beginning long before 
the IMP (ibid).  This indicates that some of the benefits of free trade, as well as development 
programs, were felt before the launch of the IMP.  Others have argued that the theory of cumulative 
causation has prevailed and that the market dynamics emphasized in the EU tend to accentuate 
inequality.  (Cumulative causation says that growth centers will continue to prosper because of 
their existent infrastructure and concentration of industries whose high-tech nature, capital intensity 
and cost structures ensure scale economies.  This concentration diverts investment from poorer 
regions and attracts skilled labor, leaving the lagging regions in the underdevelopment trap.)  
Foreign direct investment has agglomerated in the increasingly wealthy regions, generally the 
capital cities, in the EU’s southern, poorer members (Greece, Spain and Portugal), thus having 
limited impact on the overall economies (Jaggi, 1996).  Instead of workers moving to other EU 
members where there is demand, thereby alleviating unemployment in their native countries as 
neoclassical theory predicts, significant labor mobility has occurred mostly within these countries, 
as both skilled and unskilled workers have migrated to the prosperous industrial and commercial 
centers (ibid).  Werner also found that persisting or even increasing gaps between low-income and 
high-income regions within member states tend to contain potential migration flows within 
individual member states, rather than inducing workers to migrate across national borders (Werner, 
1996).  This phenomenon has accentuated already wide disparities in income and living standards 
between the urban and peripheral areas.  Skills, higher incomes and jobs become concentrated in 
industrial regions of the three nations, thereby depriving the struggling regions of human resources, 
demand and a tax-base (Jaggi).  While integration has led to the increase of exports to northern EU 
countries from the south, the level of imports has outpaced this growth (ibid).   
 
In order to alleviate these persistent problems, the EU has launched programs, such as the 
structural funds, to ease the effects of these losses on the struggling regions and provide 
infrastructure aid.  In fact, due to the increased spending, industries related to infrastructure works 
in the worst-off countries greatly outperformed both their historical trends and the growth rates in 
other industries, over the post-1987 period (Fingleton, Lewney and Pinelli, 1996).  However, these 
programs should not be seen as simply a transfer payment to ‘compensate the losers’, but as a long-  15
term strategy to foster technology transfer, encourage banking and commercial services, correct for 
infrastructure imbalances, and ensure human capital formation (Jaggi).  They are essential to meet 
the EU’s social objectives of cohesion and convergence.  As the case of Ireland demonstrated, it is 
the effective use of aid that fosters growth and ensures the realization of the benefits of integration. 
 
This evidence points to the conclusion that there has been an overall increase in economic 
welfare in the EU due to its integration’s resultant increased levels of trade as well as convergence, 
as the theory on this subject indicated.  However, not all regions or firms in all sectors have 
benefited.  Due to the increased competition, many less-efficient firms will or have closed, and 
some poor regions will likely continue to suffer from out-migration and underinvestment, even with 
the assistance of the structural funds.  Further, this is a long-term process and full benefits should 
not be expected immediately.  The achievement of the gains of integration are also realized through 
transfer payments and effective economic development strategies, as the contrast between Greece 
and Ireland illustrates.  Yet, as the research in this field indicates, there is a significant overall 
benefit, and the advantages will increase as the effects are further felt and as the short-term 
adjustment period ends.  There are particular advantages for border regions, which profit from their 
new non-peripheral positions.  Although the internal market has not reached its full potential, its 
credibility and irrevocability have exerted profound effects on business behavior (European 
Commission).   16
 
PART TWO:  ECONOMIC DISINTEGRATION             
 
THOUGHT ON ECONOMIC DISINTEGRATION 
  
While there has been a fair amount written on economic integration theory, very little has been said 
about the converse situation—disintegration.  With the end of the Cold War and revived 
nationalism throughout Eastern Europe, disintegration has been a powerful trend, deserving of 
more consideration.  Neoclassical theory has had a difficult time addressing why countries 
disintegrate since theory presupposes rational behavior in individuals and organizations.  History 
has shown that disintegration usually occurs due to an increasing dissatisfaction with social, 
political and economic conditions, often inciting resentment of transfer payments to worse-off 
regions or rekindling feelings of domination by another group.  Further, the end of the age of 
empires has reduced the advantage of large unions as a form of protection.  “Globalization,” or the 
increasing liberalization of trade worldwide, has also reduced the relative advantages of economic 
unions.  
 
Fidrmuc and Fidrmuc (2000) are the only ones to have explored the cost of disintegration in 
Eastern Europe.  They note that this lack of interest is likely due to the predominant orientation of 
economists on integration since it is more forward-looking.  However, the cost of borders in 
general has been documented.  Ricardo Hausmann, studying the effects of geography on 
development, noted that national borders make nations artificially more distant and accentuate 
transportation costs.  Even within North America, simply crossing the U.S.-Canadian border is 
equivalent to adding from 4,000 to 16,000 kilometers worth of transportation costs (Hausmann, 
2001).  Indeed, “Canadian provinces trade 20 times more intensively with each other than with U.S. 
states, after controlling for distance and economic size, despite large extent of economic integration 
and the absence of linguistic and cultural barriers between these two countries” (Fidrmuc and 
Fidrmuc, 2000, p. 8).  Borders clearly do matter for bilateral trade flows, even when they do not 
imply the imposition of explicit barriers to trade directly (ibid, p. 21).  With this in mind, the 
“commercial logistics of trading between countries with weak political institutions and a history of 
cross-border animosity will prove to be infinitely more expensive problems for importers and 
exporters” (Hausmann).  Further, borders also create serious challenges for coordinating 
infrastructure development, particularly when relations between two nations are strained, as is the 
case with many disintegrated unions, such as Yugoslavia.  The costs of disintegration would 
therefore be expected to be quite profound.       
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The impact of economic break-ups depends on many factors indicating the level of 
integration, which Fidrmuc and Horváth outlined.  The degree of inter-regional labor mobility 
partly reveals the level of social integration, as workers are more likely to move when there are 
fewer cultural and language barriers.  Sufficiently high labor mobility within the union serves to 
mitigate the effects of uneven regional unemployment, since workers can then move to the jobs in 
other regions of the union.  The diversification of industrial structure also predicts the impact of 
disintegration.  The more diverse a region’s economy, the more able it is to act in an autarchic 
manner, and therefore the less likely it is to be dependent on trade with other regions.  It is also less 
likely to be devastated by shocks to a single industry.  Inter-regional fiscal transfers are also a 
common policy of federal governments that is abandoned when countries split, creating an 
incentive for disintegration for more developed countries, but a loss to the underdeveloped ones.  
The intensity of intratrade reveals the level of the potential disruption of firm linkages.  An amiable 
split that results in fewer barriers to trade (i.e. maintaining free trade agreements) can reduce the 
impact of the loss.  Finally, the degree of openness of the economy is also a predictor of the impact 
disintegration will have on trade patterns (Fidrmuc and Horváth, 1998).  While this list is not 
exhaustive, it does describe the main issues that determine the impact of economic disintegration 
on the new nations’ trading patterns and intensity. 
 
Very little has been written about the impacts of economic disintegration at the firm level.  
Depending on the level of disintegration and the policies implemented to ease the effects, such as 
maintaining free trade arrangements, the forward and backward linkages of firms can be expected 
to be disrupted.  Firms may have to find new suppliers for their products.  New barriers to trade 
may cause firms to no longer be able to compete in certain markets, and they may have to search 
for new ones.  Further, the movement of capital and labor will be impeded by the new borders, 
making it increasingly difficult for the firms and workers to make the most efficient arrangements.  




ECONOMIC DISINTEGRATION EMPIRICAL STUDIES 
 
The Council for Mutual Economic Aid 
The Council for Mutual Economic Aid (CMEA or COMECON) was set up in 1949 consisting of 
six East European countries: Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, Romania, and the USSR, 
followed later by the German Democratic Republic (1950), Mongolia (1962), Cuba (1972), and   18
Vietnam (1978).  A number of developing countries have attended as observers.  Its aim was to 
develop the member countries’ economies on a complementary basis for the purpose of achieving 
self-sufficiency, by means of central planning.  There was multilateral cooperation between 
member states based on five-year plans and inconvertible rubles.
3  In its first years CMEA did little 
more than foster bilateral trade, but after the mid-1950s it promoted economic specialization among 
its members.  However, proposals for large-scale economic integration, favored by the Soviet 
Union, met stiff opposition from some countries, especially Hungary and Romania, which feared 
domination by more industrialized members.
4  Firms in these centrally planned states could not 
export or import without authorization of the State Foreign Trade Organizations organized by 
industry (Maurel and Cheikbossian, 1998).  (However, the situation was different for the more 
market influenced economies of Yugoslavia, which became a partial CMEA member in 1964, and 
later in Hungary.)  Firms sold their outputs valued at domestic prices to the Export State Agencies, 
which traded with foreign partners at world prices.  A symmetric system applied for imports.  
These State Foreign Trade Organizations were not profit maximizers, but they had to reach targets, 
for exports and imports, established by central planning.  Moreover, since the internal price system 
had not relationship to domestic costs, and since the ruble was inconvertible, the existence of these 
organizations was justified (ibid).   
  
In 1990 agreement was reached for a fundamental change in the economic policy pursued 
by the CMEA and a free market, bilateral trade and convertible currencies were embraced.  A 
transitional period was expected to be required by members to accommodate this change in policy.  
Rapid political and economic changes in the Communist world in 1991 led to the dissolution of 
CMEA, which the new non-communist governments of Eastern Europe saw as an outmoded 
instrument of Soviet domination.  CMEA was then replaced by the Organization for International 
Economic Cooperation, which would continue to encourage international trade between the 
member countries on a bilateral basis and offer advice and information on regional economic 
problems.
5  However, the new East European leaders rejected continued cooperation with the 
Soviet Union in large part because they believed it would slow the transition to a market economy 
and integration with Europe.
6  The Organization for International Economic Cooperation has 
therefore been largely ineffective and there is no comparable successor to the CMEA. 
 
 
                                                             
3 http://ps.ucdavis.edu/classes/ire001/econ/comecon.htm 
4 http://encarta.msn.com 
5 http://ps.ucdavis.edu/classes/ire001/econ/comecon.htm   19
 
Impact 
The deep social and economic structural differences between Eastern and Western Europe 
depressed the level of trade between them during the communist era, biasing upward intra-CMEA 
trade.  However, the break-up of the CMEA brought about the collapse of trade within the area and 
was accompanied by a full-scale geographical reorientation of international trade from East to 
West.  The liberalization of foreign trade in most former CMEA countries has been radical in both 
scope and in speed (Maurel and Cheikbossian, 1998).  As the State Foreign Trade Agencies broke 
up, quotas were eliminated or reduced in the countries, giving them new trade policy tools.  Trade 
was redirected toward wealthier, nearby Western European markets.  The EU eliminated all tariffs 
for most of these nations, except in ‘sensitive sectors’, such as agriculture, industry or textiles 
(ibid).  These restrictions have resulted in little change in the structure of trade, despite the increase 
in flows, thus the changes have not improved the comparative advantages of former-CMEA 
countries (ibid).  However, the other preferential arrangements for East-West trade have diverted 
regional trade flows.  The Central European Free Trade Agreement
7 (CEFTA) was formed in 
December 1992 in response to this trend.  Its goal was to eliminate trade barriers among the 
countries involved in the agreement, and to eliminate discrimination against intra-former CMEA 
trade compared with the EU. 
 
Maurel and Cheikbossian observed that until 1990 trade between Eastern and Western 
Europe was below the normal level that the gravity model would predict.  They also found that 
there has been a decrease in the level of intra-CMEA trade that is more than proportional to the 
drop in GNP contraction, indicating the CMEA trade collapse that is widely-held to be true.  
Despite the regional collapse and the reorientation of trade, the intra-CMEA trade remains above 
the normal level, and the normal levels of East-West trade have not yet been reached.  The 
Economist also noted that East-West trade is at only half the normal level (May 19-25 2001).  
Maurel and Cheikbossian argue that the restrictive policy regarding ‘sensitive sectors’ does not 
allow former CMEA countries to export sufficiently in the sectors of their expected comparative 
advantages.  However, former CMEA countries have higher than average transportation costs and 
that by taking this into account, the normal level of trade has already been reached with Germany, 
the main partner of Central and Eastern Europe (ibid).  While trade potential remains with other EU 
countries, reducing the high regional transportation costs is necessary to increase the ultimate 
potential and realize significant economic gains. 
                                                                                                                                                                                                      
6 http:// encarta.msn.com   20
 
The higher than average transportation costs among former CMEA countries can be 
explained by the fact that under the centrally-planned system shipment costs were not taken into 
account.  The statistics indicate that this absence of geography in CMEA trade implies 
(paradoxically) higher transportation costs (Maurel and Cheikbossian).  This paradox can be 
explained by noting that trade within the CMEA occurred largely on a bilateral basis with the 
USSR, while now the EU turns out to be a very attractive center for the Eastern European periphery 
(ibid).  Thus, the structure of  ‘hub and spoke bilateralism’ has remained, but the center has 
changed from the Soviet Union to the European Union.  (‘Hub and spoke bilateralism’ explains that 
the creation of a trade network which originates from the center diverts trade flows in the 
periphery, and is responsible for the paradox that geographically close countries do not trade as 
much as expected.)  The preference for EU markets is due to the view of trade with Western 
markets as a powerful tool of market restructuring, through the importation of a rational system of 
relative prices.  Further, the wealthier EU countries have more money available to invest in the 









Ultimately, the disintegration of CMEA has proved to be welfare improving for most of the 
nations of the former trading bloc.  Table E shows that GDP in the countries has stabilized after the 
readjustment crisis in the early 1990s and begun steady growth, although this was also affected by 
the transition to a free market system.  Intra-CMEA trade did not compensate for the destruction of 
trade with Western Europe under the centrally planned system.  During the transition period of 
1990 to 1992 there was a net loss of trade for CMEA countries, since the regional trade collapse 
was not compensated by a large enough reorientation with the rest of the world (Maurel and 
Cheikbossian).  However, by 1993 the situation had improved and trade creation seems to increase 
yearly, with respect to both trade diversion and external trade diversion.  Further, Table F 
demonstrates that the amount of foreign direct investment has been rapidly increasing in the more 
                                                                                                                                                                                                      
7 The members include Slovenia, Czech Republic, Slovak Republic, Poland, Romania, Bulgaria, and Hungary. 
Table E. GDP (% change) for certain Former CMEA Members  
Country  1990  1991  1992  1993  1994  1995  1996  1997  1998  1999  2000 
Bulgaria -9.1  -11.7  -7.3  -1.5  1.8 2.9 -10.1  -7.0  3.5 2.4 na 
Czech Rep  -1.2  -11.5  -3.3  0.1  2.2 5.9 4.8 -1.0  -2.2  -0.2  3.1 
Hungary -3.5  -11.9 -3.1  -0.6  2.9 1.5 1.3 4.6 4.9 4.5 5.3 
Poland -11.6  -7.0  2.6 3.8 5.2 7.0 6.0 6.8 4.8 4.1 4.1 
Romania  -5.6 -12.9  -8.8  1.5 3.9 7.1 3.0 -6.9  -5.4  -3.2  1.6 
Slovak Rep   -2.5  -14.6  -6.5  -3.7 4.9  6.7  6.2  6.2 4.4 1.9 2.2 
Source: Business Central Europe   21
stable nations of Central Europe, fomenting additional economic growth.  The EU as a key partner 
in trade and investment has proved to be more beneficial than the USSR, despite the barriers to 
trading in the ‘sensitive sectors’ that has not enabled the former CMEA countries to maximize the  









The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics 
The defeat of the Russian Empire in World War I led to the seizure of power by the communists 
and the formation of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR, or Soviet Union) in 1922, 
creating the first nation based on Marxist socialism.  The brutal rule of Josef Stalin, which lasted 
from 1924 to 1953, strengthened Russian dominance  
of the Soviet Union at a cost of tens of millions of  
lives (CIA world factbook).  Politically the USSR  
was divided from 1940 to 1991 into 15 constituent  
or union republics, which were formally joined in a  
federal union, but until the final year or so of the  
USSR’s existence the republics had little real  
power.  (See Table G for a list of the republics  
and basic descriptive statistics, and Figure 1 for a map  
of the region.)  Until 1989 the Communist party  
indirectly controlled all levels of government and the  
party’s politburo effectively ruled the country (ibid).   
Soviet industry was owned and managed by the state,  
and agricultural land was divided into state farms,  
collective farms, and small, privately held plots.  General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev, who held 
power from 1985 to 1991, introduced fundamental changes to the Soviet system, including glasnost 
(openness) and perestroika (restructuring) in an attempt to modernize communism.  However, his 
initiatives inadvertently released forces that by December 1991 broke up the USSR into 15 
Table G. Descriptive Statistics on Former 
Soviet Republics 





Armenia   3.4 million   $2,900
Azerbaijan 7.7  million  $1,770
Belarus 10.4  million $5,300
Estonia 1.4  million  $5,600
Georgia 5  million  $2,300
Kazakhstan 16.7  million  $3,200
Kyrgyzstan 4.7  million  $2,300
Latvia 2.4  million  $4,200
Lithuania 3.6  million $4,800
Moldova 4.4  million $2,200
Russia 146  million  $4,200 
Tajikistan  6.4 million   $1,020
Turkmenistan 4.5  million  $1,800
Ukraine 49  million  $2,200
Uzbekistan 24.7  million  $2,500
Source: CIA World Factbook 
Table F. Foreign direct investment stock ($bn) for certain Former CMEA Members 
Country  1990  1991  1992  1993  1994  1995  1996  1997  1998  1999  2000 
Bulgaria  0.0 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 1.0 1.5 2.3 3.9 
Czech  Rep  0.0 0.6 2.9 3.6 4.5 7.1 8.5 9.8 12.5  17.5  na 
Hungary  0.6 2.1 3.6 5.6 7.1  11.9 15.0 16.1 17.5 19.3 20.2 
Poland  0.1 0.4 1.4 2.3 3.8  7.8  11.5 14.6 22.5 28.0 na 
Romania  0.0 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.6 1.0 1.2 2.4 4.5 5.4 na 
Slovak  Rep  na na na 0.5  0.8 1.1 1.4 1.6 2.0 2.1 3.6 
Source: Business Central Europe   22
independent republics (ibid).  Since then, Russia and the other fledgling republics have struggled in 
their efforts to build a democratic political system and market economy to replace the centralized 


































The former Soviet republics have faced great difficulty in establishing modern market economies 
and achieving strong economic growth.  Russian GDP has contracted an estimated 45% since 1991, 
despite the country’s wealth of natural resources, its well-educated population, and its diverse, but 
increasingly dilapidated, industrial base (ibid).  Drastic inflation has caused ordinary people find 
their wages falling by roughly 30% and their pensions by 45% (ibid).  The situation is even bleaker 
for the other former Soviet republics that had very limited political infrastructure in place and far 
less diversified economies because of their smaller sizes and the legacy of Soviet central planning.  
Table H shows that Ukraine in particular has suffered since Soviet disintegration, and the Baltics
8 
and Russia initially faltered, but have recovered in terms of GDP.  While these losses in the 
standard of living, and indeed loss of growth that Western European countries enjoyed during this 
                                                             
8 Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania 
Figure 1. Map of the Commonwealth of Independent States (Former Soviet Union, with 
Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania not highlighted)   23
period, are not entirely due to the disintegration of the USSR, this has clearly played a significant 
role, in addition to the transition to a market economy.  
 
Many of the smaller republics enjoyed inter-regional fiscal transfers from Russia and the 
other well-developed republics, such as the Baltics, in the Communist era.  The four Central Asian 
republics,
9 the poorest in the union, received substantial transfers of income through the fiscal 
system, which limited the dispersion on consumption standards among the 15 republics 
(Williamson, 1993, pg. 623).  However, this aid was lost with disintegration, creating a significant 
drawback for the lesser-developed republics, but a benefit for the wealthier ones who were no 
longer subject to such broad redistributive convergence programs. 
 
The impact of disintegration has also been affected by the intensity of mutual trade.  The 
new market-determined trade relationships between independent states has not continued with the 
same intensity or in the same direction as that inherited from the Soviet centrally planned system.  
In 1993 Williamson noted that in the long run, the total volume of trade is likely to decline, and that 
there would be a dramatic shift in the composition of trade, with much less intratrade among the 
former Soviet republics than before and much more trade between each of them and the West 
(Williamson, p. 600).  This reorientation of trade patterns is not surprising since the prior centrally 
planned trade arrangements were not necessarily optimal.  For example, while the four Central 
Asian republics received fiscal transfers, they were damaged by the internal price structure of the 
Soviet Union, and were therefore expected to benefit from improved terms of trade as a result of 
the shift to world prices (ibid, p. 623).  Indeed, these suboptimal links were significantly eroded 
with increasing trade openness and introduction of market forces.  Fidrmuc and Fidrmuc found that 
the intensity of trade relations among the Baltic States in 1992 was 40 times the normal level and 
that this dropped to around 12 time the normal level in 1994.  However, trade intensity increased 
again to more than 20 times the normal level between 1995 and 1997 (Fidrmuc and Fidrmuc, p. 
19).  It has since leveled out at around 13 times the normal level, likely due to Estonia’s inclusion 
                                                             
9 Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan 
Table H. GDP per capita (PPP) ($) for certain Soviet republics 
Country  1990  1991  1992  1993  1994  1995  1996  1997  1998  1999  2000 
Estonia 4778 4433 3992 3803 3834 4171 4449 5082 5456 na  na 
Latvia  5472 5118 3463 3070 3213 3312 3515 3920 4136 na  na 
Lithuania  na na na 3681  3409  3612  3853  4164  4425  na na 
Russia  5995 5845 5313 5009 4479 6630 6590 6760 6580 6900 7620 
Ukraine  4490 4069 3720 3299 3900 3576 3339 3333 3310 3350 na 
Source: Business Central Europe   24
in the first wave of EU accession negotiations and the negative opinion of the European 
Commission regarding non-standard trade relations of potential new members with states not in the 
EU (ibid). Table I indicates that the Baltics have increased their exports over this period, likely 
benefiting from their cross-border ties with Western Europe (through Finland), as well their 








Similarly, Fidrmuc and Fidrmuc found that trade relations among Belarus, Russia and 
Ukraine followed a U-shaped pattern, as shown in Figure 2.  Their trade intensity was also 
approximately 40 times the normal level in 1992.  Disintegration decreased this amount to about 
eight times the normal level in 1997, but then rose  
again to more than 30 times the normal level in 1998  
(ibid).  This is likely due to the Russian financial crisis,  
which caused a breakdown of trade between the former  
Soviet Republics and Western countries and  
consequently the rise of relative importance of trade  
within the former Soviet Union (ibid).  In addition,  
Russian-Belorussian efforts to re-integrate may  have  
also affected the intensity of trade levels.  Table I shows  
that while exports from Russia have grown (likely due  
to high oil prices in 2000), Ukraine has not recovered  
from the shocks of disintegration. 
 
This decline in intratrade and shift to other countries also likely represents an attempt by the 
smaller republics to attain more favorable terms of trade, as well as to diversify their economies 
once the central planning structure that enforced their specializations was removed.  Trofimov 
argues that the initially more developed country in a trade arrangement possesses a greater variety 
of intermediate factors, and its manufacturing sector is more efficient.  Trade therefore results in 
the more advanced country producing more manufactured goods than its trade partner, unless 
Figure 2.  Trade Flows 
 
Source: Fidrmuc and Fidrmuc 
Table I. Exports ($bn) for certain Soviet republics 
Country  1990  1991  1992  1993  1994  1995  1996  1997  1998  1999  2000 
Estonia  na na 0.5  0.8  1.3  1.9 1.8 2.8 3.2 2.4 3.2   
Latvia  na na 0.8  1.1  1.0 1.4 1.5 1.8 1.9 1.7 na 
Lithuania  na na 1.1  2.0  2.0 2.7 3.4 3.9 3.7 3.0 3.8 
Russia 48.8 50.9 53.6 58.3 69.6 81.1 88.6 88.3 74.2 74.4 105.2   
Ukraine  na  50.0 11.3 12.8 10.3 13.1 14.4 14.2 12.6 11.6 na 
Source: Business Central Europe   25
sufficient technology transfers occur (Trofimov, 1997).  The poorer region ends up importing 
manufactured goods from and exporting basic resources to the more advanced country.  In the long 
run the underdeveloped country may not lose in terms of welfare but may fall into the 
‘underdevelopment trap’ (ibid).  This may well be the case of many of the smaller former Soviet 
republics, especially those in Central Asia.  Once exposed to the free market, these nations sought 
to further diversify their economic structure, not least because the trade links they had depended on 
were disrupted by the economic shocks following the break-up. 
 
Throughout the USSR’s history, the degree of inter-regional labor mobility was influenced 
by many forces.  While Russian language dominated throughout the USSR, most of the other 
Soviet republics had their own distinct languages, cultures and differing religions.  However, these 
were suppressed throughout the communist period, which enabled the greater mobility of labor.  
Since 1985 there have been many structural shifts in the economy, creating uneven unemployment 
levels, which has increased the rate of occupational reallocation (Sabirianova, 2000, p. 29).  
Structural shifts, such as those caused by disintegration and the restructuring process, could even 
induce people to change their career despite a good occupational match or a well-established 
career.  Further, downward occupational mobility is also a common labor response to negative 
demand shocks and poor firm performance—workers often react by choosing occupations with 
lower skill requirements since they have lower investment costs.  In addition, local labor market 
conditions, which reflect an uneven speed of structural changes and unequal outside opportunities 
across regions, are critical determinants of occupational shifts (ibid).  The push factor of high 
regional unemployment seems to be the most powerful cause of increased mobility. 
 
Policy 
In order to lessen the impact of the USSR’s disintegration, the Commonwealth of Independent 
States (CIS) was founded.  The CIS is a community of independent nations established by a treaty 
signed on December 8, 1991, by the heads of state of Russia, Belarus, and Ukraine.  By 1993 all of 
the former republics of the USSR except the Baltic states had become members.  The organization 
was conceived as the successor to the USSR in its role of coordinating the foreign and economic 
policies of its member nations.  The treaty recognized current borders and each republic’s 
independence, sovereignty, and equality, and established a free-market area embracing the 
republics’ interdependent economies and a joint defense force for participating republics.
10   
 
                                                             
10 http://www.encyclopedia.com/articles/02985.html   26
However, the republics’ level of receptivity to integration with Russia has varied.  All CIS 
nations now have their own currency, despite initial attempts to share a currency, and most 
members have criticized Russia for slow implementation of CIS agreements (ibid).  Belarus has 
strengthened ties with Russia, signing a treaty to coordinate their defense and foreign policy 
apparatus and to eliminate trade restrictions and eventually unite their currencies in 1996.  The two 
nations have since signed several follow-up agreements, but actual progress toward integration has 
been slow.  In addition to Russia and Belarus, Kazakhstan (which has a large Russian community), 
and Kyrgyzstan also agreed to pursue economic integration without customs restrictions; an 
eventual customs union including additional CIS nations is planned, but again, little has been 
accomplished to date (ibid). 
 
Nearly a decade after its creation, observers have noted that the CIS has failed to integrate 
the Soviet successor states in any meaningful sense.  “Although, on paper, it has been the forum for 
several ambitious projects of cooperation, in reality the CIS has been gradually emptied of 
responsibility and has been witness to a diminishing base of collaborative activities” (Webber, 
1999).  The CIS has not met any of the expectations: it has not become the successor state to the 
USSR, and there is no Commonwealth citizenship, no standing joint armed forces and no common 
currency (ibid).  Instead, there are divergent processes of state formation, nation building, 
economic diversification and foreign policies in constant uncomfortable interaction with one 
another (ibid).  However, the organization has been successful in one key area—avoiding conflict 
and the total breakdown of links between the successor states.  While the CIS’s founders had 
endeavored to facilitate the realization of more equitable and mutually beneficial economic 
cooperation, the political stability it contributed to is still a significant accomplishment.  The post-
Soviet space has been characterized by an increasing diversity of ties below the ambitious 
infrastructure of the 12-member CIS, forged through sub-regional and bilateral channels (ibid).  
The polarization of opinion among the member states of the CIS has clearly debilitated the 
organization. 
 
Further, lack of CIS membership has not stopped trade relations between the Baltics and the 
other former Soviet republics.  Alexseev and Vagin found that cross-border relations between the 
Baltics and the Russian city of Pskov remain of primary importance to the Russian city, despite 
their lack of CIS membership (1999).  Agency policies at different levels of government in Estonia 
and Latvia (especially those with financing or prospects of financing from European institutions) 
have offered their Pskov counterparts tangible benefits that could not be matched by the Russian   27
federal center.  A network of relations has been emerging between these officials in Pskov and in 
the Baltic states to deal with specific economic and trade issues in cross-border areas, 
marginalizing geopolitical tensions.  The growth and internationalization of private business in 
Russia and the Baltic states, particularly in the oil and transit sectors, created a whole new layer of 
actors that did not exist in Soviet times and that now play a role in shaping regional development 
strategies in Russia (ibid).  “The geoeconomics of oil and gas shipments through Russia’s north-
west to the Baltic Sea and the converging interests of companies suggest that Pskov would be better 
off participating in a new Hanseatic League than withdrawing into Fortress Russia” (ibid).  
 
Czechoslovakia 
In the early 9
th century the Czech and Slovak tribes formed the Greater Moravian Empire which 
covered Central Europe.  In 906 the Empire was conquered and the Slovaks were ruled by the 
Hungarians for the next 1000 years.  The rise of Bohemia continued for the ensuing 400 years as a 
kingdom under Czech rule and grew to include parts of Austria, Poland and Germany.  Bohemia 
reached its cultural and political peak under Charles IV, who ruled from 1346 to 1378 and was 
crowned the Holy Roman Emperor, making Prague the empire’s leading city.  This period was 
followed by 40 years of religious wars.  In 1526 the weakened kingdom elected the Habsburgs to 
the Czech throne and for the next 300 years Bohemia was part of the Austrian empire.  In 1618 the 
Czech Protestants revolted against the Habsburg rule, which touched off the Thirty Years’ War, a 
series of wars that spread throughout Europe.  During this time the Habsburg armies defeated 
Bohemia and the country lost self-governing power.  Both Slovakia and the Czech regions regained 
their independence in 1918 and formed Czechoslovakia.  The two were separated from 1938 to 
1945, but after World War II they were once again united and became a communist nation under 
the Soviet sphere.  With the collapse of Soviet authority in 1989, Czechoslovakia regained its 
freedom through the peaceful “Velvet Revolution.”  In 1993, the country underwent a “velvet 
divorce” into its two national components, the Czech and Slovak Republics.  (Please see Table J for 
basic descriptive statistics and Figure 3 for a map of the region.)  This break-up was two-fold: on 
January 1, the country disintegrated as a political union, while preserving an economic and 
monetary union to lessen the negative impact of disintegration.  However, the Czech-Slovak 
















  The velvet divorce was largely a result of the economic structural differences between the 
two parts, and the subsequent desired course of action, despite remarkable economic, social and 
demographic convergence during the communist period (Fidrmuc and Horváth, 1998).  These 
differences were revealed by the unequal distribution of costs and benefits of the post-communist 
economic reform.  Slovaks viewed the communist rule positively since they had benefited from the 
period’s industrialization, urbanization and economic growth, which resulted in greater 
convergence with the more advanced Czech Republic and a greatly improved standard of living 
(Hilde, 1999).  In contrast, Czechs viewed the communist period as a time of great political 
repression and economic stagnation and were consequently enjoying the post-communist changes.  
Bohemia alone received 80 to 90% of foreign direct investment in 1991, causing many Slovaks to 
think the federal government was  
failing to advance their interests (ibid).   
It is therefore not surprising that the  
two republics would choose different  
economic policies, which is what  
ultimately led to the disintegration of  
Czechoslovakia.   
 
Impact 
The extent of mutual trade between the Czech and Slovak Republics was and has remained 
relatively high, although the Slovak Republic is more dependent due to its smaller size.  In 1991 the 
Czech Republic accounted for half of Slovak exports and imports, while the Slovak Republic 
accounted for about a third of Czech trade (Fidrmuc and Horváth, 1998).  After the break-up, the 
Table J. Descriptive Statistics for former 
Czechoslovakia 





Czech Republic  10.2 million $11,700 
Slovak Republic 5.4 million $8,500 
Source: CIA World Factbook 
Figure 3. Map of Czech and Slovak Republics 
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share of Slovak trade with the Czech Republic fell to 31% of exports and 25% of imports.  Czech 
trade with the Slovak Republic declined to 14% of exports and 10% of imports (ibid).  Mutual trade 
fell substantially in 1992 and 1993, but then leveled off after 1994.  This level was likely facilitated 
by the customs union.  The gravity model that  
the trade level within Czechoslovakia exceeded  
the normal level by nearly 40 times (Fidrmuc  
and Fidrmuc, p. 18).  However, this  level  
dropped considerably during the first two years  
after the split and was at seven times the  
normal level in 1998 (see figure 4).   
Nevertheless, this level of trade intensity far  
exceeds that measured within the EU, even  
though the customs union between the Czech  
and Slovak Republics is largely comparable to  
trade liberalization within the EU (ibid, p. 19).  Since the split, both countries have increased their 
trade with the larger, wealthier markets of Western Europe, which they border since these levels 
were below normal due to the previous influences of intratrade and trade with CMEA countries.  A 
further decline in bilateral trade intensity between the two former constituent members is to be 
expected if the custom union is dissolved after Czech accession to the EU.    
 
As noted, the two republics had varying levels of industrial structure diversification, which 
caused different impacts of the break-up.  The Slovak Republic was more concentrated on exports 
biased toward manufactured products with relatively low value-added, as well as heavy 
engineering, metallurgy, and chemical industry, which made it more dependent on trade with 
CMEA countries.  This made the Slovak Republic more susceptible to the shocks of restructuring 
that the whole region underwent, ultimately leading to the fundamental disagreement on economic 
policy, and the split (Fidrmuc and Fidrmuc, p. 10).  Table K shows how the Slovak Republic’s 






Table K. Exports ($bn) for Czech and Slovak Republics 
Country  1990  1991  1992  1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998  1999  2000
Czech  Rep.  5.9 8.3 8.4  13.0 14.0 21.6 21.9 22.8 26.3 26.9 28.9 
Slovak  Rep.  5.8 3.3 3.7 5.5 6.7 8.6 8.8 8.3 10.7 10.2 13.1 
Source: Business Central Europe 
Figure 4. Trade Flows 
 
 




Throughout its post-war history, there was a significant net transfer of funds from the Czech 
Republic to the Slovak Republic, largely in the form of federal tax revenue redistribution.  
Estimates of the size of the transfer in 1992 vary from 4.4 to 8% of Slovak GDP.  Fiscal transfers 
had a large influence on the convergence of per capita income within the former federation—the 
gap fell from 40% in 1948 to 13% in 1988 (Fidrmuc and Fidrmuc, p. 12).  The size of the net 
transfer increased throughout the transition period due to the asymmetric impact of reform-induced 
recession.  However, this aid dried up with the split, creating an additional blow to the Slovak 
economy, but benefiting the Czechs. The Slovak Republic was at a further disadvantage for lacking 
the political infrastructure that the Czechs had in Prague.  The initial shock of disintegration 
resulted in a budget deficit of 7% of GDP for the Slovak Republic (Business Central Europe). 
 
Policy 
By initially preserving the economic union, including a common currency, customs union and 
common labor market, despite the political separation, the two republics were trying mitigate the 
economic effects of the break-up.  However, the brief life span of the monetary union reveals that 
monetary union was marred by low credibility, lack of political commitment, low exit costs, and 
the absence of fiscal transfers (Fidrmuc and Horváth).  The benefits of a single currency rise with 
the volume of trade, which remains significant between the two countries.  While Czechoslovakia 
could be considered an optimum currency area, it was in fact less integrated than some other 
existing unions, which facilitated the split.  Further, the additional pressure on the Slovak economy 
due to the end of fiscal transfers ultimately created the need to resort to monetary policy to counter 
the effects.  (Slovak inflation reached 23% in 1993, according to Business Central Europe).  “In the 
absence of fiscal transfers, and given continuing economic decline and persisting unemployment 
differences between the two republics, monetary union would have been costly for the Slovak 
Republic even in the short run” (Fidrmuc and Horváth).  “In fact, the costs of the break-up of 
Czechoslovakia and dissolution of the monetary union were relatively low, even in the short-run.  It 
seems that in the world of free-trade, small countries and regions benefit since the importance of 
political boundaries declines”(ibid, p. 17). 
 
Despite the free labor area that two republics retained, there was not an increase in labor 
mobility, and therefore this policy did not alleviate the situation in the Slovak Republic after the 
break-up.  Sufficiently high labor mobility within the union serves to mitigate the effects of   31
asymmetric shocks, since workers can then move to the jobs in other regions of the union.  While 
there were no formal barriers to mobility in the Czech and Slovak Republics, and language, cultural 
and religious ones were minimal, labor mobility was not high as revealed by regions suffering from 
persistently higher unemployment in the Slovak Republic.  Research has indicated that while labor 
mobility did serve to reduce the impacts of asymmetric shocks in 1992, the amount was very 
modest, and therefore not very efficient (Fidrmuc and Fidrmuc, p. 11).  Table L shows that 
unemployment remains markedly higher in the Slovak Republic, despite the opportunities to move 
to more prosperous regions.  In fact, people are far more rooted in their communities than economic 
theory allows for.  The Economist observed that “Poor Central Europeans may also be more 
reluctant to uproot themselves than is often assumed.  Even within countries, populations can be 
strikingly immobile.  In the Czech Republic and Hungary, the capitals... are booming, whereas 
other parts of the country have high unemployment.  But there has been no mass migration to the 








Yugoslavia consisted of six republics: Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Montenegro, 
Macedonia and Serbia (including the two autonomous provinces of Vojvodina and Kosovo).  The 
history of the region is complicated, involving numerous population movements and mingling, as 
well as waves of foreign domination that affected the republics in different ways.  Many Croats 
point to the long history of their nation, distinct from the other republics of Yugoslavia, as an 
explanation of the republic’s independence movement.  When the Roman Empire was divided in 
395, Slovenia, Croatia and part of Bosnia-Herzegovina remained with the Western Roman Empire, 
while present-day Serbia, Montenegro and Macedonia went to the Eastern Roman Empire, later 
known as the Byzantine Empire.  In 925 Dalmatia (the coastal region) was united with Slavonia by 
Tomislav, forming a single kingdom that prospered for nearly 200 years.  The throne fell vacant in 
the 11th century, resulting in power struggles that weakened central authority.  Much of the 
Dalmatian coast fell under control of Venice from the 12th century until Napoleon conquered the 
Venetian Republic in 1797.  The rest of the country fell under the control of Hungary when a group 
of Croatian nobles concluded the Pacta Conventa in 1102, conceding Hungary the Croatian crown 
Table L. Unemployment (end-year, %) in Czech and Slovak Republics 
Country  1990  1991  1992  1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998  1999  2000
Czech  Rep.  0.8 4.1 2.6 3.5 3.2 2.9 3.5 5.2 7.5 9.4 8.8 
Slovak  Rep.  0.8 0.0 4.8  12.2 14.8 13.1 12.8 12.5 15.6 19.2 17.9 
Source: Business Central Europe   32
in exchange for Croatian autonomy and for protection against the Orthodox Byzantine Empire.  In 
1389 Ottoman Turks took Serbia at the Battle of Kosovo.  By the late 15th century, they controlled 
Bosnia and Herzegovina as well.  During 400 years of rule under the Turkish Ottoman Empire, 
Islam took root among some Serbs and Croats, eventually creating a split between Muslims and 
Orthodox Christians.  After the Turks defeated the Hungarians in 1526, northern Croatia and 
Slovenia turned to the Catholic empire of Austria-Hungary for protection.  Dalmatia also remained 
under Austria after Napoleon was defeated.  Many Croats and Slovenes converted to Catholicism, 
creating another distinction among Slavs.  They remained under Habsburg influence until 1918.  
However, the Serbs gained their independence in 1878 after Russia defeated the Turks.  Bosnia and 
Herzegovina fell under the Austro-Hungarians at this time.  Kosovo and Macedonia, regions the 


















A revival of Croatian cultural and political life began in 1835.  In 1848 a liberal democratic 
revolution led by Josip Jelačić was suppressed, but serfdom was abolished as a result.  In 1868 
northern Croatia was transferred from Austria to Hungary, united with Slavonia, and granted more 
autonomy.  During the crucial period of nation-formation in the 19th century, Western European 
nations developed in a way that tied national identity with certain constitutional institutions and 
                                                                                                                                                                                                      
11 Throughout the Croatia section I used the Croatian spelling for people and places to maintain accuracy.  See 
Figure 5. Map of the former Yugoslavia (Macedonia not highlighted) 
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procedures and thus moderated political ideologies both among political elites and ordinary 
citizens.  The value of democratic national integration is based on the fact that it guarantees a 
rational, procedural decision making in the political community (and thus excludes or at least 
reduces the influence of radical  
and emotional mobilization  
strategies) (Zakošek, 1993, p.  
162).  “The communicative  
character or democratic political  
institutions guarantee an open  
definition of the political  
community and disconnects  
membership requirements from  
quasi-naturalistic qualities (such  
as allegedly distinct ethnic origin  
or even race)” (ibid).  In Central  
and Eastern Europe, the process  
of national integration was  
hindered economically by the  
peripheral position of the societies and their dependence on the core economies of the emerging 
world economy, and politically by the Habsburg, Ottoman and Russian Empires.  Under these 
unfavorable conditions national integration in Croatia, and other nations in the region, was 
promoted mainly by national movements and intellectual elites, and based on ideologies of national 
integration (ibid, p. 163).  While this trend was common to many nations throughout the region, it 
deftly describes the case of Croatian nationalism, which ultimately significantly contributed to 
Yugoslav disintegration. 
 
With the defeat of the Austro-Hungarian empire in World War I, the Kingdom of Serbs, 
Croats and Slovenes was formed (called Yugoslavia after 1929, which means “southern Slavs”) 
that had its capital and power concentration in Belgrade.  Many Croats supported the unity of the 
Slavic people with a nearly identical language, and believed that they would be less susceptible to 
the influences of the larger, surrounding powers when united (Economist Intelligence Unit).  
However, this was strongly resisted by Croatian nationalists who had been struggling for 
independence for decades, and arranged the assassination of King Aleksander I (of the Serbian line) 
                                                                                                                                                                                                      
Appendix C for a pronunciation guide. 
Figure 6.  Timeline of Croatian History 
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th century BC Greek colonies established along the Dalmatian coast. 
229 BC Romans began their conquest of the indigenous Illyrians, establishing a 
            colony near Split in Dalmatia. 
395 Roman Empire divided.  Croatia stayed with the Western Roman Empire. 
625 Slavic people migrated to Croatia from Poland. 
925 King Tomislav united Croatia.  
1102 Pacta Conventa signed and northern Croatia fell under Hungarian control.  
1527 Northern Croatia turned to the Habsburgs of Austria for protection  
1848 A liberal democratic revolution led by Josip Jelačić was suppressed, but  
         serfdom was abolished. 
1917 Croatia became part of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats & Slovenes, called  
         Yugoslavia after 1929. 
1941 Germany invades Croatia and Ustaša movement put in power. 
1945 Tito and his communist party take power. 
1948 Stalin expels Yugoslavia from Cominform and Tito takes independent,     
          non-east-west stance. 
1974 New constitution tries to address issues of federalism and nationalism. 
1980 Tito dies. 
1991 Croatia declares independence. 
1995 Dayton peace accord signed. 
1999 Tuđman dies. 
2000 More Westward-looking government elected, headed by Stipe Mesić.   34
in 1934.  After the German invasion of Yugoslavia in March 1941, a puppet government dominated 
by the fascist Ustaša movement was set up in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, which attempted to 
expel or murder all Serbs, Jews and Roma (gypsies).  However, not all Croats supported these 
policies.  Maršal Tito, the post-war leader of Yugoslavia, was a Croat-Slovene who fought with 
tens of thousands of Croats against this, and who ardently believed in Slav unity.  Massacres of 
Croats conducted by Serbian Četniks in southern Croatia and Bosnia forced almost all antifascist 
Croats into the communist ranks, where they joined the Serbs defending themselves from the 
Ustaša.  In all, approximately one million people died during the war, which was fought mainly in 
Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina.  
 
At the end of World War II, Yugoslavia became communist in the Soviet image—the state 
owned the means of production, resources were allocated by detailed central plans, and the 
communist party stood without political opposition (Gapinski, 1993).  Tito consolidated his power 
at the end of World War II by purging his government of non-communists and by holding 
fraudulent elections that legitimated the abandonment of the monarchy.  The Federal People’s 
Republic of Yugoslavia was proclaimed under a new constitution in November 1945.  The 
constitution divided the country into six republics, and two autonomous provinces within Serbia. 
 
In 1948, Stalin expelled the country from the Cominform
12 largely because Tito refused to 
submit to domination by the Soviet Union.  By 1950 Yugoslavia was cut off from the Soviet Union 
and its eastern European satellites and steadily drew closer to the West.  However, Tito ultimately 
came to conceive of his internal and foreign policy as being equidistant from both blocks.  He 
sought closer cooperation among states that were “nonengaged” in the East-West confrontation.  
This split ultimately resulted in the Yugoslav rejection of statism and the creation of the “third 
way” (Gapinski, 1993).  This new philosophy was self-management wherein capital was owned by 
society as a whole rather than by the state.  Workers managed the socially owned firms consonant 
with legislated dictates.  In a sense, workers acted as partners in the firms, and as such, they 
participated in the decision process.  This doctrine took shape slowly from about 1950 (ibid). 
                                                             
12Communist Information Bureau, which was an agency that was organized in 1947 and dissolved in 1956.  Its 
members were the Communist parties of Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, France, Hungary, Italy, Poland, Romania, the 
Soviet Union, and Yugoslavia. The Cominform attempted to reestablish information exchanges among the European 
Communist parties that had lapsed since the dissolution (1943) of the Comintern. Its decisions were not binding, nor 
was membership obligatory for Communist parties.  It was not a reconstitution of the Comintern, only a setting up of 
information contacts.  Its chief function was the publication of materials designed to demonstrate the unity of its 
members.  In 1948 the Cominform expelled the Yugoslav Communist party because of the defiance by Tito of Soviet 
supremacy. In 1956, as a gesture of reconciliation with Tito, the Cominform was dissolved. 
(http://www.encyclopedia.com) 
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The 1960s and 1970s saw many tensions between federalists and nationalists within the 
nation.  Tito’s response to the crises was the constitution of 1974, which included various internal 
rules and rituals (including a rotating presidency to lead Yugoslavia after Tito’s death) were 
supposed to formalize equality among the six republics and Serbia’s two autonomous provinces. 
This system promoted the weaker and smaller federal units at the expense of the big two, Serbia 
and Croatia.  Serbia’s displeasure at the independent role assigned to its autonomous provinces and 
the promotion of minority identity (especially that of the ethnic Albanians in Kosovo) was felt 
already in Tito’s last years, but it became radicalized after his death in 1980.  Serb resentment 
provided the opening for Slobodan Milošević and other promoters of recentralization, who 
contributed greatly to the undoing of Tito’s federal system during the following decade.  The 
dissolution has brought into the open long suppressed conflicts between the developed republics, 
Slovenia and Croatia, and the less developed ones, above all Serbia, which center around the role 
and scope of the common state.  (Table M shows  
the size and current economic power of the  
republics.)  Slovenia and Croatia demanded  
greater degree of autonomy, proposing  
confederation as an alliance of sovereign states,  
while Serbia demanded a “democratic  
federation” that practically meant greater role  
of the central administration and elimination of 
 the confederal elements introduced by the Constitution of 1974  (Pešić, 1993, p. 153).   
However, there were additional social factors that contributed to conflict, including the role of the 
personality of national leaders, and the mental atmosphere created by the intellectuals, the Church 
and the mass media (ibid). 
 
In 1990 all of Yugoslavia’s republics, catching the tide away from Communist dictatorship 
sweeping Eastern Europe, held competitive multiparty parliamentary elections that were won by 
nationalist parties.  In June 1991 Slovenia and Croatia declared independence, followed by 
Macedonia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, splintering the nation after 73 years of union.  On April 27, 
1992, Serbia and Montenegro acknowledged the breakaway of the four republics by proclaiming 
themselves the successor state to the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, taking the name 
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.  However, Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Yugoslavia were 
embroiled in territorial battles for the following few years, resulting in mass migrations of different 
Table M. Descriptive Statistics for the 
Former Yugoslavia 
Country Population  GDP  per 
capita 
Bosnia-Herzegovina 3.8  million  $1,770
Croatia 4.5  million  $5,100
Macedonia 2  million  $3,800
Slovenia 1.9  million  $10,900
Yugoslavia* 10.7  million  $1,800
*Serbia’s population is 10,529,507 and Montenegro’s 
is 680,736 according to Encarta. 
Source: CIA World Factbook, 1999, 2000   36
ethnic groups.  The Dayton peace agreement, signed in December 1995, brought an end to the 
conflict and restored the region of Eastern Slavonia (which makes up nearly a quarter of Croatia’s 
territory) to Croatia from Yugoslavia.  
 
Impact  
Slovenia, the most developed republic of the former Yugoslavia, was relatively unscathed in the 
conflicts of the 1990s.  However, the disintegration and resulting wars that took place in the region 
during the early and mid-1990s affected Slovenia’s economy and trade relations, although in the 
short-term.  GDP per capita was $6,052 in 1992, a sharp decline from the pre-independence figure 
of $8,658 in 1990 (Ramet, 2001).  Tourism was limited by the war, and the large population of war 
refugees was a further drain on the economy.   However, sound economic policies and the 
republic’s solid infrastructure and skilled workforce, helped reverse the downward trend.  Table N 
shows that by 1993 GDP began to grow again and that exports rebounded by 1992.  Inflation 
slowed by 1993, and investor confidence grew as demonstrated by the rise in foreign direct 
investment.  By 2000, GDP per capita had grown to $16,790, adjusted for purchasing power parity, 
and the nation is currently slated for the next round of EU accession, symbolizing its stabilization 
and acceptance by Western countries.  Slovenia is a clear case where disintegration has not harmed 
the country in the medium-term.  Trade intensity with richer markets in the EU will likely increase 
with EU accession contributing to growth, and it has also been freed from the transfer payments to 














Table N. Descriptive Indicators for Slovenia 
INDICATOR  1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
Nominal GDP 
($bn) 
17.4 12.6 12.5 12.7 14.4 18.7 18.9 18.2 19.6 20.0 18.6   
GDP per capita 
PPP ($) 


















-10.5 -12.4 -13.2 -2.8  6.4  2.0 1.0 1.0 3.7 -0.5  6.2   
Unemployment 
(end-year %) 
Na  na na na Na  na Na  14.8  14.6  13.0  11.9   
Inflation  (%)  551.6 115  207.3 32.9 21.0 13.5 9.9  8.3 7.9 6.2 8.9   
Exports  ($bn)  4.1 3.9 6.7 6.1 6.8 8.4 8.4 8.4 9.1 8.6 8.7   




Na na  Na 1.0 1.3 1.8 2.1 2.4 2.6 2.7 2.7 
Source: Business Central Europe   37
Macedonia
13, one of the least economically developed republics, saw its GDP fall by more 
than 30% in the wake of Yugoslavia’s disintegration, from 1991 to 1995 (Rusinow, Hayden, Dyker, 
2001).  International economic sanctions placed on the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia by the 
United Nations beginning in 1992 took away an important market, especially for the republic’s 
agricultural products.  In 1994 and 1995 Greece imposed a blockade on Macedonia, deepening the 
country’s economic slump.  (Greece asserted that “Macedonia” was historically and exclusively a 
Greek name and that its use by Greece’s northern neighbor implied a territorial claim to the Greek 
region of Macedonia.)  An underground gray economy, which comprises businesses that operate 
outside the tax and social security systems and that disregard government regulations, grew in the 
FYROM during that period (ibid).  It was estimated that in 1998 the gray economy accounted for 
fully one-half of the republic’s GDP.  In March 1999 the North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
(NATO) began a campaign of air strikes against Yugoslavia over Kosovo, further isolating the 
nation and damaging its trade partner.    
 
Bosnia-Herzegovina was one of the poorest republics of the former Yugoslavia and has 
suffered the most from the disintegration since it resulted in a territorial/ethnic conflict that was 
fought largely on its soil.  The war shattered the newly independent country’s economy, and 
recovery has been tentative.  At the end of the war, in 1995, the country was effectively divided 
three ways—among the Muslims, Croats, and Serbs—despite  international attempts to unite it.  In 
1990 Bosnia’s imports totaled about $1.9 billion, consisting primarily of fuel, machinery, 
transportation equipment, miscellaneous manufactured products, and chemicals (Dyker, 2001).  In 
the same year, exports totaled about $2.1 billion, consisting mainly of miscellaneous manufactured 
products, machinery, and raw materials (ibid).  However, the war severely disrupted Bosnia’s trade, 
with both the rump Yugoslavia and Croatia imposing economic blockades on the republic and 
supply routes being obstructed by the fighting.  In 1996 imports totaled $1.9 billion and exports 
$171 million.  The huge trade deficit reflects the degree of Bosnia’s dependence on foreign aid 
(ibid). 
 
The case of Serbia and Montenegro, which constitute the current Yugoslavia, is bleak as 
well.  As a recent article in Business Central Europe put it, “the Yugoslav economy has had the 
blood sucked out of it over the past ten years.”  
Independent analysts reckon that the economy has slipped back by 50 years, with GDP per 
head more than halving to $1,200... The reasons for the plunge are not to do with last year’s 
bombing, but with a decade of war, economic mismanagement and international isolation. 
                                                             
13 Legally known as the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonai (FYROM)   38
Industrial production has plunged by around 70% in the past ten years, but little capacity 
was lost in the NATO bombing raids... less than 5% of factory space was flattened. 
The problem is rather that war and sanctions have made it impossible to use that capacity.  
Serb companies were designed to supply the whole of the old Yugoslavia, but now find 
themselves stuck in a small home market of ten million (increasingly poor) people.  They 
are far more isolated than companies in neighboring Croatia were, when it was ruled by 
hardline president Franjo Tudjman.  Croatia faced hefty tariffs on its exports to the EU, but 
half of its trade was still with the West.  Serbia simply could not trade at all, except for a 
few agricultural goods exported to neighboring countries.  
Add to that the complete lack of money in the economy, and the fact that Milosevic-
supporting managers were allowed to drain cash out their companies, and Serb industry has 
simply withered away. That’s why the economy had been bouncing along the bottom for 
several years before last year’s bombings. (November 2000) 
 
This is a case of clear disintegration, with almost no trade ties left from the splintering union, and 
the devastating effects trade isolation has had.  However, the various conflicts the rump Yugoslavia 
was engaged in over the decade and the resultant economic sanctions make it difficult to estimate 
the exact implications of disintegration alone.   
 
CASE STUDY: IMPACTS AT THE FIRM LEVEL IN CROATIA 
Like most Central European capitals, the streets of Zagreb buzz with activity.  The beautiful 
architecture and well-kept public gardens hint at prosperity.  The trams run regularly, the people are 
dressed in the latest European fashions with their cell phones ringing, and the cafes are full.  Yet a 
closer look reveals some of the economic hardships the people endure.  Outside the city center, the 
buildings show their neglect in recent years.  Most people will tell you that they are lucky to have 
any job with unemployment at 22.5%, even though most feel underpaid and resent the lack of 
employment choices.  (The average monthly wage is $640 according to Business Central Europe, 
but the Zagreb Chamber of Commerce says it is closer to $400.)  Most Croats can only afford to eat 
out maybe once a month—which may explain why the cafes are full of people just having a coffee.  
Although their education is good, there is not much opportunity to use what they have learned.  The 
restructuring of the nation’s economy and introduction of competitive forces has revealed that 
many firms are not efficient, resulting in many closures and reduced employment opportunities.  
The stability enjoyed in the socialist era has disappeared, creating a stressful situation for many 
people, and the government now has limited capability to provide a social safety net.  There has 
also been a fall in the quality of public services such as health care and pension plans, which 
dispelled the illusion that the market would provide a Western standard of living overnight (UN 
Human Development Report, 1988, p. 75).  
 















After independence, Croatia was faced with the legacy of communist mismanagement, 
similar to that of most Central and Eastern European countries.  The nation suffered from poor 
infrastructure, inefficient economic structures, uneven regional development, bad environmental 
legacy, lack of multi-party political structures, and weak local institutions.  In addition, there was a 
lack of small and medium-sized enterprises, which are widely considered to be the building blocks 
of a strong civil society that facilitates business relationships and reduces transaction costs.  
Macroeconomic indicators, including high unemployment, high inflation and decline in production, 
indicate that the standard of living has decreased considerably after secession (see Table O).  The 
country of 4.5 million people currently has a GDP per capita of $7,090, adjusted for purchasing 
power parity (Business Central Europe).
14  The purchasing power of Croatian citizens decreased 
dramatically after Yugoslav disintegration, although it is rebounding, as shown in Table O.  While 
the kuna (the Croatian currency) has stabilized, this has come at the cost of high interest rates.  
During the conflict in Croatia, the government issued large amounts of debt to finance their military 
efforts, which contributed to high inflation.  Increased fiscal spending to offer the services formerly 
provided by the Yugoslav government also contributed to the rampant inflation.  In October 1993 
the government implemented a stabilization program, decreasing the money supply, which caused 
the real exchange rate to appreciate.  (Table O shows inflation rates over the period and the drastic 
drop from 1149.3% to -3% after the stabilization program was launched.)  The real exchange rate 
appreciation made imported goods cheaper for Croatian consumers.  However, their exported goods 
were more expensive, thereby decreasing the competitiveness in the world market of Croatian 
Table O. Descriptive Indicators for Croatia 
INDICATOR  1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
Nominal  GDP  ($bn)  24.4 20.0 10.0 11.6 14.6 18.8 19.9 19.9 21.7 20.2 na 
GDP  per  capita  PPP  ($) 4866 4177 3959 3616 5060 5610 6330 6730 7080 7090 na 
GDP  (%  change)  -7.1  -21.1  -11.7  -8.0  5.9 6.8 5.9 6.8 2.5 -0.4  na 
Industrial production 
(% change) 
-11.3 -28.5 -14.6 -5.9  -2.7  0.3 3.1 6.8 3.7 -1.4  1.7 
Unemployment (end-
year %) 
na  na  27.9 28.9 19.6 16.9 12.4 17.6 18.1 20.4 22.5 
Average monthly wage 
($) 
435.1 402.3 111.0 147.1 359.2 552.0 597.2 595.5 649.5 640.1 na 
Inflation  (%)  609.5 123.0 665.5 1149.
3 
-3.0  2.0 3.5 3.6 5.7 4.2 6.2 
Exports  ($bn)  2.9 3.3 3.1 3.9 4.3 4.6 4.5 4.2 4.5 4.3 4.4 
Imports  ($bn)  4.4 3.8 3.4 4.9 5.2 7.5 7.8 9.1 8.4 7.8 7.9 
Trade Balance ($bn)  -1.5  -0.5 -0.3 -1.0 -0.9 -2.9 -3.3 -4.9 -3.9 -3.5 -3.5   
Foreign direct 
investment stock ($bn) 
na  na  0  0.1 0.2 0.3 0.9 1.4 2.3 3.6 na 
Population  (m)  4.5 4.5 4.6 4.7 4.7 4.7 4.5 4.6 4.5 4.5 4.5 
Source: Business Central Europe   40
firms.  Many people decried this policy as short-sighted, and some believed that the government 
was using this policy in order to benefit high-placed politicians, leveling numerous charges of 
corruption and cronyism against then President Tuđman. 
 
Croatian firms have faced three primary challenges since independence: the War of 
Yugoslav Succession (locally referred to as the “homeland war”), the economic transition to a 
market economy, and the establishment of a new national economy.  Interviews with three large 
firms in Zagreb, Kraš, INAS-TAS and Tehnika, helped determine the specific effects of economic 
disintegration.  (See Appendix B for summaries of the interviews.)  Three prominent trends 
emerged from these interviews:  businesses are re-orienting their export markets from the former 
Yugoslav republics and Eastern Europe to the wealthier, more stable markets of Western Europe; 
the high cost of capital is impeding business growth and competition against foreign firms; and 
Croatian firms are facing a significant “brain drain” as the most educated look for better 
opportunities in other countries. 
 
  Many Croatian firms were designed to serve  
the Yugoslav market of 22 million people, but found  
their domestic market reduced to 4.5 million after  
independence.  Croatia arranged free trade  
agreements with Slovenia and Macedonia in 1997. 
Macedonia is not a prominent trade partner for  
Croatia, likely due to its geographical inaccessibility  
(see map in Figure 5) and its poor economic  
conditions.  Slovenia is the richest market, although  
the smallest in the former Yugoslavia.  Figure 8  
reveals that it is currently the fourth most important  
market for Croatian firms.  It also provides a geographic passageway to the larger and richer 
markets of the EU.  However, trade between the two nations is rather limited.  The trade intensity 
between them was 11 time the normal level in 1992—far less than the other unions that were 
trading at 40 times the normal level.  Further, Figure 7 reveals that the trade intensity between them 
dropped in the wake of disintegration to about three times the normal level in 1994 (Fidrmuc and 
Fidrmuc, p. 20).  This level is likely partly in response to Slovenia’s anticipated EU accession in 
the next wave.  A free trade agreement was enacted with Bosnia-Herzegovina on January 1, 2001, 
                                                                                                                                                                                                      
14 The Zagreb Chamber of Commerce estimates GDP per capita at $4,482 and the CIA World Factbook says $5,100. 
Figure 7.  Trade Flows 
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but there remain many social barriers due to the conflict.  The rule of law is widely perceived to be 
very weak in Bosnia-Herzegovina, making business difficult and raising transaction costs.  
Bosnians also have limited purchasing power due to the poor economic conditions of the country.  
(Table P shows that GDP per capita is only $1,770.)  However, the nation remains the third largest 
export market for Croatia despite these obstacles, as indicated in Figure 8.  The current Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia remains one of the largest potential markets for Croatian firms.  It offers 
the advantages of proximity, historical business ties and a common language.  Western European 
countries with common history and/or the same or similar languages trade substantially above the 
normal level (i.e. between Austria and Germany it is twice the normal level, and is 2.5 times the 
normal level between the UK and Ireland) (ibid).  However, this does not appear to hold true in the 
former Yugoslavia.  Further, the economy in Serbia and Montenegro is so weak after economic 
sanctions, war and the ensuing slow-down, that there is little demand for services or goods that 
Croatia could offer (average monthly salary there is $40, Business Central Europe, November 
2000).  Another important deterrent is the residual prejudices that discourage contact of any sort 
between the groups, although negative feelings are strongest towards the Serbs, who led the war 
effort against Croatia.  Overall, the disintegration of the former Yugoslavia has had much more 
profound consequences on trade than in other former federations in Eastern Europe (Fidrmuc and 


















Figure 8. Croatia’s Main Export Partners (1999) (thousands, in US$) 



























With the disintegration of Yugoslavia and the transition to a free market economy, Croatia 
also lost the markets of Eastern Europe and the Middle East.  Entirely new trade arrangements had 
to be formed, mainly on a bilateral basis.  This process is very time-consuming, creating 
uncertainty for firms, which slowed down the economy.  In 1992 Croatian President Tuđman 
declined to join CEFTA despite an invitation.  A free trade agreement was signed with Hungary in 
February 2001, which should prove to be beneficial due to its proximity, relative wealth and large 
market size (see Table P).  However, it is also part of the first wave of Eastern European countries 
expected to join the EU and trade intensity between the two will therefore likely drop in the future.  
The breakdown of Eastern markets forced domestic producers to turn to demanding Western 
markets, as most former CMEA members did.  Table P shows that the Italian and German markets 
offer the largest opportunity for Croatian firms.  They are both accessible and have historical trade 
relationships as well.  Most importantly, they both have very large populations with high levels of  
purchasing power.  Figure 8 reveals that in fact these nations are indeed the most important export 
partners, with Austria also being a prominent market with its high standard of living and proximity.  
As there is a trend that western European producers outsource their production into lower labor cost 
countries, there might be an opportunity for Croatian manufacturers to enter into the production 
systems of large western companies.  It can be an opportunity to acquire expertise and initiate 
necessary organizational changes (Zagreb Chamber of Economy, p. 72).  Further, since the levels 
of trade between Eastern and Western Europe were far lower than normal levels (roughly 40%) 
Table P. Economic Indicators of Croatia’s Trade Partners 
Country  Population GDP (PPP) GDP per 
capita 
Albania 3.5  million  $5.6  billion  $1,650 
Austria* 8.1  million  $190.6  billion  $23,400 
Bulgaria**  7.8 million  $34.9 billion  $4,300 
Bosnia-Herzegovina 3.8  million  $6.2  billion  $1,770 
Croatia 4.5  million  $31.9  billion  $5,100 
Czech Republic**  10.3 million  $120.8 billion  $11,700 
Germany* 82.8  million  $1,684.0  billion  $22,700 
Greece* 10.6  million  $149.2  billion  $13,900 
Hungary 10.1  million  $79.4  billion  $7,800 
Italy* 57.6  million  $1,212.0  billion  $21,400 
Macedonia 2  million  $7.6  billion  $3,800 
Poland** 38.6million  $276.5  billion  $7,200 
Romania** 22.4  million  $87.4  billion  $3,900 
Russia 146  million  $620.3  billion  $4,200 
Slovakia** 5.4  million  $45.9  billion  $8,500 
Slovenia 1.9  million  $21.4  billion  $10,900 
Yugoslavia 10.7  million  $20.6  billion  $1,800 
* indicates EU membership   
** indicate CEFTA membership 
Bold indicates former Yugoslav member 
Source: CIA World Factbook, 1999, 2000   43
prior to disintegration and the end of the Cold War, it is natural for trade intensity to increase now 
that these barriers have dropped (Fidrmuc and Fidrmuc, p. 16).   
 
All three firms interviewed noted that they had reoriented their exports.  INAS-TAS, an 
export-oriented machine tools firm, realized the necessity of refocusing its market to Western 
European countries after disintegration.  While it has always imported the inputs for its products 
from Germany, it now exports approximately 80% of its finished products back to Germany.  Italy 
and Austria are also large markets for INAS-TAS products, but Russia is no longer a big customer 
since the economic difficulties in the nation.  However, some business ties remain with other 
Eastern European countries as well as Bosnia and Macedonia, although these are a small portion of 
the business.  Drago Šavora, director of INAS-TAS, did not think that CEFTA would have 
particular advantages for INAS-TAS since it has already concentrated so much of its market in 
Western Europe.  He did note that CEFTA membership would perhaps facilitate connections or cut 
paperwork with firms in Central European countries, but he did not expect this to increase his 
market share.   
 
Kraš, a confectionery company, had a similar situation.  While was able to export to 
Slovenia easily, the other former Yugoslav markets have proved more difficult to re-enter.  There is 
some demand in Bosnia, but the purchasing power of people there is very low, so they must offer 
the products at a lower price.  As a result, some people were re-importing the products into Croatia 
from Bosnia (a similar problem was faced by Russian companies).  With the dramatic decrease in 
their domestic market resulting from disintegration, Kraš refocused it attentions to the markets in 
surrounding countries, as well as Australia and the United States, which also have sizeable Croatian 
populations.  However, entering these new markets creates large costs because of the need to 
promote brand recognition through expensive marketing—a particularly important factor for a 
cultural good.  Damir Žderić, sales and marketing coordinator for Kraš, also noted that CEFTA 
membership was not desirable, citing the difficulty of competing with much larger foreign firms 
that are much stronger financially.  Kraš now only has 70% of the Croatian market due to increased 
competition from abroad and the firm does not want its share to drop further.   
 
Tehnika, a design, civil engineering and construction firm, completed numerous projects 
within the other Yugoslav republics, although the majority of their work was done in Croatia before 
the break-up.  Since then, they too have ended their work in the former members of Yugoslavia. 
Tehnika has also decreased the number of projects in Western Europe due to changes in the   44
increasing integration of the EU, which makes it more cost effective to hire labor from Portugal or 
East Germany.  The economic turmoil in Russia has decreased demand for Tehnika’s services 
there.  Nenad Koritnik, the assistant general manager of the firm, did not think that free trade 
agreements with the other republics were necessary right now, but instead believes that these 
opportunities will come with time and that it was more important to first rebuild the local economy.  
  
The high price of capital was cited as one of their most significant barriers to growth for 
Croatian firms.  Tehnika’s Koritnik observed that the economic conditions in Croatia greatly inhibit 
firms from accessing sufficient financing to successfully bid on projects and named the high cost of 
capital as the largest obstacle facing his firm.  Koritnik believes that the government could best 
help his company by creating a better climate for investment.  He argued that, as the economy as a 
whole grows, there will be increased demand for Tehnika’s services.  Current President Mesić has 
made reducing interest rates to below 10% one of his policy goals, yet he also hopes to maintain the 
exchange rate.  Since his election in 2000, the money supply has been increased slightly, which has 
decreased interest rates.  However, they remain prohibitively high at around 20%.  Further 
increases in the money supply could jeopardize the stable exchange rate, which other export-
oriented firms like INAS-TAS depend on.  Increased competition among Croatian banks, which 
have been mostly privatized and floated on the London stock exchange, and the introduction of 
foreign bank branches, has not had the desired effects either.  This high cost of capital is not 
specifically due to the disintegration, but to its downstream effects.  In the case of Croatia it 
resulted mainly from the issuance of war debt, yet many other countries faced similar problems 
with the crisis period following abrupt economic union break-ups, when fiscal spending is 
increased to maintain public services.  Further, the formation of a new currency requires an 
adjustment period when uncertainty looms, making investment highly risky and therefore 
decreasing opportunities for firms and individuals to access capital at affordable prices.   
 
“Brain drain” has also become a significant obstacle for Croatian institutions.  As the 
stability and quality of life enjoyed in the socialist era has eroded, many of the brightest and best-
educated Croats look for better salaries and opportunities in other countries.  Further, experienced 
policy-makers often leave the public sector for more lucrative positions in the burgeoning 
commercial sector, resulting in an “internal brain drain” as public resources dwindle (Kupiszewski, 
1996).  The decreasing quality of public services, including health care and pension plans, has 
further encouraged the outmigration of the best educated.  Despite the fact that many skilled 
émigrés are forced to downgrade their professional careers and take jobs with much lower   45
qualifications than they command (as noted by Kupiszewski and Sabirianova), this trend continues.  
However, while the attraction of better economic conditions causes long-term migration, the largest 
push for outmigration usually occurs following periods of political upheaval, such as disintegration, 
when uncertainty is highest (Drbohlav, 1996).  This outmigration poses particular problems for a 
small nation like Croatia, which has only a limited number of high quality individuals that it cannot 
afford to educate and then lose.  In fact, Croatia has one of the largest diasporas of European 
countries (third after Ireland and Great Britain) with large communities in the U.S., Canada and 
Australia (UN Human Development Report, 1988, p. 5).  The existence of a large disapora of 
nationals abroad can also facilitate and stimulate chain migration (Kupiszewski).  Ethnic 
emigration increases through friendship and kinship links since a safety net is already in place in 
the new country, greatly facilitating the transition process and easing the navigation of complicated 
immigration laws.    
 
Šavora, a representative of INAS-TAS, a machine tools manufacturer, noted that some of 
his most skilled employees had fled Croatia in search of better opportunities.  Since Croatian 
independence, INAS-TAS has contracted considerably and is now only one tenth of its former size, 
in terms of employees.  Šavora believed that many former employees were able to find other jobs 
or retired, but that many more remain unemployed—many of the more skilled staff went abroad to 
find better jobs, contributing to the brain drain.  Similarly, Tehnika dropped from approximately 
4,500 employees in 1985 to 1,500 in 2001.  This drastic workforce reduction resulted gradually, 
according to Koritnik, as the number of projects decreased.  The projects in the other former 
Yugoslav union members were stopped and those in Western Europe slowed, decreasing demand 
for labor.  In addition, many Bosnian laborers and ethnic members of other republics who were 
working in Croatia were not eligible for Croatian citizenship and were forced to leave.  While most 
Bosnian workers were low skilled, there were many from throughout the former Yugoslavia who 
were highly qualified that firms had to let go.  This ethnic-nationality policy was also damaging to 
mixed-ethnicity families, who often emigrated en masse since they had no “homeland”.  Koritnik 
also explained that many workers have retired or left for better-paying jobs and that they have not 
hired replacements.  Early retirement was often the manner of laying off surplus workforce, 
resulting in additional pressure on the budget and higher taxes.  Early retirement plans also put 
people out of the workforce who could still be very productive, further contributing to the group of 
workers who leave the country in search of employment opportunities.  While outmigration eases 
the pressure of high unemployment, the absence of the educated classes creates difficulties when   46
firms do grow and need to hire more talent.  Ultimately brain drain seriously affects the ability of 
firms and government to innovate and expand.   47
P A R T   T H R E E :   C O N C L U S I O N S            
 
GENERAL LESSONS 
Despite the economic theoretical argument against economic disintegration, many regions choose 
this course mainly for political considerations, including the often-noted desire for self-
determination.  In an era of increasing trade liberalization, there are likely to be more cases of 
political devolution (such as even in long-establish nations as Great Britain) and disintegration.  
Most of these will entail economic disintegration to a certain extent as the relative advantages 
decrease with new opportunities opening up as trade liberalization spreads.  The case of integration 
in Western Europe has shown that facilitating trade does bring increased welfare, but that in order 
for convergence to take place transfer payments and effective development programs are necessary.  
The benefits of integration are therefore political and social as well as economic.  However, the 
constituent members may not benefit from such a close union, particularly if they have significant 
structural differences that hinder their ability to reconcile their views on economic and monetary 
policy, as the case of Czechoslovakia vividly depicts.  Further, without the widespread political 
will, transfer payments may not be possible. 
 
The economic cost of disintegration depends upon the level of integration, as well as the 
policies put in place to mitigate the impact.  The level of integration is indicated by the intensity of 
mutual trade, the diversification of the industrial structure, degree of inter-regional labor mobility, 
degree of openness of the economy and the amount of inter-regional fiscal transfers.  For less 
developed regions, disintegration means the end of fiscal transfers, which created a significant loss 
for the Slovak Republic, the Central Asian Soviet republics, as well as Macedonia.  “Regions trade 
off efficiency gains from integration and the cost of not having redistribution policy preferred by 
the median voter.  When income inequality differences across regions and the efficiency gains from 
integration are small, unions break up” (Fidrmuc and Horváth, p. 3).  In general, the less integrated 
the members are, the less they are disturbed by the disintegration.  Further, maintaining some 
aspects of the union, such as free trade agreements, customs unions or free movement of labor, can 
also alleviate the economic shocks of a union’s disintegration, although labor movement has proved 
to be less common than economic theory predicts. 
 
There is a significant cost of nation-building—creating new government ministries and 
financial institutions, as well as renegotiating foreign treaties, including trade agreements.  These 
fledgling republics have faced numerous challenges in creating a new nation.  They must all 
address political issues of ethnic or civic identity and other considerations about the rights of   48
citizenship.  They must determine “how to reconcile civic identities based on inclusive citizenship 
and exclusive ethnic identities based on such common characteristics as culture, religion, language 
and a common ancestor of a dominant nationality, on the one hand, and of ethnic minorities, on the 
other” (Tolz, 1998).  Further, they have to agree upon new borders and monitor them, which has a 
significant cost.  This was especially important for Russia, which had problems with the former 
Soviet republics re-exporting energy supplies, which they had obtained from Russia at below world 
market prices (Williamson).  Croatian firms also faced this problem in Bosnia-Herzegovina.  
 
The constituent members of a splintering union will go through a restructuring period with 
regards to their trade patterns and intensity.  In the case of post-communist nations, the previous 
trade arrangements were not necessarily optimal, but in fact were politically enforced as a result of 
the strains of the Cold War, which made CMEA countries closed to the West.  However, even 
without these East-West boundaries, it is clear that trade between unions is higher than the normal 
level (i.e. the level as predicted by the economic potential of the respective countries and the 
distance between them).  Further, certain trade arrangements like the CMEA can lead to ‘hub and 
spoke bilateralism’, which artificially inflates transportation costs and causes neighboring countries 
to trade below normal levels.  These suboptimal links are often ended with increasing trade 
openness, as well as with the introduction of market forces in transitional economies.  The former 
constituent members of an economic union will initially go through a decline in the level of trade 
intensity after a break-up.  However, trade intensity remains far above the normal level several 
years after disintegration, likely due to the established relationships between firms and cultural 
understanding formed over the years of union.  After the break-up, the newly-formed nations will 
re-direct their trade to reach more normal levels with other countries, that had been repressed 
during the union, creating more advantageous relationships as the incentives to trade with the 
former partners are reduced relatively.  This readjustment might allow countries to find more 
favorable terms of trade and maximize the benefits of their comparative advantages. 
 
The split of an economic and political union often incites a crisis due to the uncertainty of 
the future.  As firms determine the effects on their supply chains, there is a short-term reduction in 
output.  The former Soviet republics demonstrated this, as many of their firms lacked the needed 
inputs for their goods in the period directly following disintegration (Williamson, 1993).  However, 
in the case of Eastern Europe this was also tied to the end of the centrally planned system.  The 
chaos of the split in many cases causes governments to go into deficit spending as they struggle to 
establish the governing infrastructure, often sparking rampant inflation, as the cases of the Slovak   49
Republic and Croatia demonstrated.  Inflation also results with the uncertainty surrounding the 
introduction of a new currency.  This results in a decreased standard of living, as imported 
consumer goods are no longer affordable.  Further, the disruption of the supply chains results in 
shortages of some goods in the short-term.  Additionally, inflation causes the cost of capital to 
skyrocket, impeding business growth and exacerbating their lack of competitiveness against foreign 
firms, as they enter their domestic market.  The decreased standard of living, although likely short-
term, and future uncertainty often lead to population outmigration.  Croatian firms noted that they 
are facing a significant “brain drain” as the most educated look for better opportunities in other 
countries, which will inhibit future growth of domestic firms as well as result in a loss of potential 
government leaders.  Further, the loss of a common labor market also caused firms to lose valuable 
employees.  Tehnika’s numerous Bosnian workers had to leave Croatia after disintegration, 
creating a significant loss. 
 
  At the firm level, the case study of Croatia demonstrates the challenges posed by economic 
disintegration on linkages and consumer markets.  The loss of the markets of the other republics 
has drastically reduced demand for Croatian goods and services, forcing most firms to lay off large 
numbers of their employees.  Efforts to enter new markets impose large costs in marketing and 
creating new distribution relationships, as well as in the negotiating of trade agreements.  This has 
been a particular strain on producers of cultural goods, such as Kraš.  The refocus to more 
developed markets, which have higher purchasing power, creates additional difficulties for 
Croatian, and other restructuring countries’, firms that are lagging in competitiveness due to the 
transition to a market economy.  They also face increased competition in their domestic markets 
due to increasing economic openness, at a volatile time.  However, Kraš and other firms noted that 
their linkages were not disrupted since Yugoslavia had a more open economy and looser 
relationship with CMEA countries.  As a result, the firms had already established relationships with 
suppliers from other countries, notably Germany, which provided access to higher quality inputs.  It 
is probable that the other disintegrating nations of Eastern Europe saw their supply networks more 
disrupted, as indicated by the drop in output in the wake of disintegration.   
 
Most Croats noted that overall, the costs of disintegration of Yugoslavia were dwarfed by 
the other two challenges the nation experienced in the 1990s.  The transition to a market economy 
and subsequent privatization of firms, as well as the costs of the War of Yugoslav secession and 
loss of tourism revenues and population displacements it brought about were far more powerful 
destructive forces.  Trade relationships do change with the formation of new nations and new trade   50
agreements, but the costs this creates are short-term.  Trade openness and unhindered market forces 
should ultimately bring about optimal links, as long as social barriers are not formed as a result of a 
traumatic break-up, as is the case with Croatia and Yugoslavia.   
 
POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 
The policies recommended here should mitigate the negative effects economic disintegration 
process.  They are intended to foster business growth and competitiveness, as well as the formation 
of new, advantageous forward and backward linkages following an economic union break-up.  As 
they are based on interviews with business leaders and many were directly requested by them, they 
should effectively address the needs of firms that arise due to the disintegration process. 
 
If possible, economic unions should be gradually dissolved, rather than abruptly, in order to 
reduce the economic shock of disintegration.  This will allow sufficient time to create a stable 
monetary system and control inflation, thereby maintaining affordable prices for consumer goods 
and avoiding interest rate hikes.  Further, additional time will enable firms to plan on the break-up 
and will not disrupt supply linkages to such an extent.  However inefficient current practices may 
be, it is better that any activity that produces positive value added continue until it is possible to 
make the investments that will permit the factors it employs to be redeployed into new activities 
(Williamson, p. 600, ).  Fidrmuc and Fidrmuc have shown that trade between disintegrating unions 
often initially dips below the level it settles at in the medium term.  Therefore, concerns that 
intratrade intensity will collapse are not ill founded and the fear that this collapse will further 
intensify the downward spiral is plausible.  Williamson also asserted that it is wrong to argue that, 
because of the expectation of a long-run decline in intratrade, the sooner the decline comes the 
better (ibid).  Instead, a gradual shift to the most advantageous firm links through new trade 
relationships would be optimal.  The provision of an effective intra-republic interbank system of 
settlement might avert the danger of a collapse in trade during the shift to a market basis.  The 
primary issue on which that focuses attention is the system for effecting payments between 
republics (ibid, p. 600).  Additional support needs to be given to enable enterprises to trade directly 
with one another.   
 
The creation and promotion of export assistance programs would help firms establish new 
relationships in other countries and enter new markets, facilitating the formation of advantageous 
trade relationships.  The need for effective programs of this sort is clear.  In Croatia, “domestic 
producers do not have a defined strategy of marketing their goods on the international market:   51
neither according to assortment criteria, nor market segmentation, nor any other criteria.  They just 
try to take any opportunity for export, most frequently adopting a low price policy or large 
assortments” (Baletić, 1995, p. 45).  Further, these efforts should be at the local level, perhaps 
based at the chambers of commerce, so that they can best serve the interests of firms.  “The process 
of decentralization is of key importance for the improvement of competitiveness on a local level.  
Local communities should be given more freedom and power to organize concrete activities and 
programs, set up support services, consulting, information centers, training and specialized 
education and to coordinate and monitor their implementation” (ibid, p. 139).  Export assistance 
programs can help overcome the market failure of lack of information about supply and demand 
opportunities. 
 
In order to further facilitate firm growth, access to capital is essential.  Therefore the 
government should ensure that its provision at reasonable interest rates is realized.  Tehnika cited 
this as a particular problem to expansion and competitiveness.  Capital is also necessary for new 
business formation.  Government programs ensuring loans at reasonable interest rates would 
therefore be a highly effective manner of promoting domestic firm competitiveness.  In addition, 
venture capital programs and foreign direct investment should be encouraged.  Croatia received 
$3.9 billion in FDI in 1999, which was a dramatic increase over the decade as there was none in 
communist times (see Table O).  While these investments may reduce local control over businesses, 
the benefits they create in capital-starved regions are significant. 
 
  Monetary policy can also be used to assist firms.  Export-oriented firms, such as INAS-
TAS, can greatly benefit when the exchange rate is not overvalued.  While this makes imported 
goods more costly, it does allow firms to export more and therefore creates increased economic 
growth.  Firms such as Kraš would also be able to sell their goods in poorer markets such as 
Bosnia-Herzegovina and Yugoslavia at a competitive price. 
 
Newly-formed nations should engage in free trade agreements with other countries, 
especially within the region.  However, this should be done gradually.  Indeed, the Croatian firms 
all indicated their preference for gradualism and no shock exposure to other competition.  In the 
case of Croatia, the country should prepare for accession to the European Union and work to 
overcome social barriers to trade with the other countries of the former Yugoslavia, but also move 
to improve trade relationships with CEFTA nations.  However, liberalization of trade alone is not 
sufficient, particularly for post-communist countries.  The refocus to more advanced markets,   52
which have higher purchasing power, creates difficulties for Croatian firms that are lagging in 
competitiveness.  As a result, accession to free trade agreements, such as CEFTA or the EU, is not 
desired by many businesses, which fear that they would lose domestic market share as foreign 
business move in.  The consensus among Croatian business leaders was that it was first more 
important for them to complete reorganization and regain competitiveness before entering these 
broad agreements, particularly since they already have access to many markets through bilateral 
arrangements.  Trade agreements with countries of similar development levels would provide the 
opportunity to expand the market available to firms, but not expose them to the competition of far 
richer and more developed firms.  As Trofimov argues, development patterns of transition 
economies depend on trade patterns and dynamic comparative advantages acquired through 
specialization in trade, and a disadvantageous initial position of a country may lead to a permanent 
loss of markets and competitiveness (Trofimov, 1997).  Therefore, a certain degree of 
protectionism may help create and maintain the all-important initial advantages.  He also argues 
that geographically close transition economies, such as CIS countries, should avoid participation in 
regional economic blocs with new industrial and developing countries that are relatively advanced 
in manufacturing.  This can increase the possibility of wrong trade specialization and cause further 
loss of competitiveness (ibid).  Consequently, trade between CIS or CEFTA countries is preferred 
because it does not entail such negative effects, as their economies do not differ significantly in 
terms of initial comparative advantages in manufacturing.  Further, lack of trade agreement 
membership does not stop trade between nations.  For example, lack of CIS membership has not 
stopped trade relations between the Baltics and the other former Soviet republics.  Cross-border 
relations, and indeed, non-regional trade relations, can still be significant.  Moreover, trade between 
similarly developed countries should improve the opportunities for beneficial specialization and 
may to some extent remedy the negative effects of trade with advanced nations (ibid). 
 
  Efforts to maintain other benefits of integration should be made.  Notably, the free 
movement of labor can ease the costs of disintegration.  The Croatian firms noted that they lost may 
workers of other nationalities who were forced to leave Croatia since they were not eligible for 
Croatian citizenship.  The literature on migration has indicated that fears of mass migrations to 
richer regions are largely unfounded.  However, the small amount of migration can reduce pressure 
on a struggling region and also helps firms who need labor, particularly those with specifically 
demanded skills.  The shared history within a union will facilitate the recognition of qualifications 
as well as diminish language and cultural barriers, making migration easier.  Former constituent 
members of a union should also endeavor to maintain other common policies, such as standards and   53
technical rules, which will not disrupt linkages.  Countries may be economically better off pursuing 
independent economic and monetary policies, but they should still work to achieve the benefits that 
increased trade and the free movement of capital and labor provide. 
   54
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APPENDIX A:  PROTOCOL FOR FIRM MANAGER INTERVIEWS       
 
 
[These questions are intended for people who have been managing a firm since before Croatia 
seceded from Yugoslavia.  The purpose of this study is to determine what changes firms have 
experienced through the disintegration of Yugoslavia, NOT due to the conflict or the effects of 
privatization.]   
 
1)  Before Croatia’s independence did you sell your products in the other Yugoslav regions?  What 
portion of your output did you sell there? 
 
 
2)  Do you still sell some of your product to these other countries?  How much has this changed? 
 
 




4)  Before independence did you attract labor or investment from the other regions of Yugoslavia? 
How was that affected by the secession? 
 
 
5)  Before independence did you import products, inputs or services from the other regions?  How 
was that affected by the secession? 
 
 
6)  If your business has contracted due to the loss of the markets of the former Yugoslavia, what 
has the impact been on the community?  Have your former workers found other jobs easily? 
 
 




8)  Do you sell your products in other countries now that you did not before?  Which ones?  What 
caused your firm to focus on a new market? 
 
 
9)  What policies could the government implement that would help you overcome the 
disadvantages created from the erection of these new borders and reach these markets again?    59
APPENDIX B:  SUMMARY OF FIRM INTERVIEWS             
 
INAS-TAS 
Drago Šavora, director of INAS-TAS, explained the importance of the machine tool business like 
this: “If pants are the economy, then machine tools are the belt—the economy would fall down 
without them.”  Rather clever for non-native English speaker, but also disturbing to realize that if 
that is so, how close the Croatian economy came to collapsing.  Since Croatian independence, 
INAS-TAS has contracted considerably and is now only one tenth of its former size.  The firm 
produces conventional and CNC machine tools, machine centers, flexible machining systems, 
special purpose machines and automatic production lines.  INAS-TAS has existed for over 60 years 
(before privatization it was known as “Prvomajska”) and prides itself on its long tradition of high 
quality products and technical solutions, which it has maintained by a commitment to developing 
new products, providing modern production equipment, and by investing in its own personnel.   
 
  Machine tools are an export-oriented business.  Before independence, INAS-TAS produced 
all its products in Zagreb using Croatian labor and sold most of its output in the other Yugoslav 
republics, as well as to other East European countries, particularly Russia.  Because of 
Yugoslavia’s political position between Western and Eastern Europe, it was able to effectively 
serve as a bridge for Western technology to the Eastern markets.  However, with independence and 
the economic collapse in Eastern Europe, INAS-TAS refocused its market to Western European 
countries.  While it has always imported the inputs for its products from Germany, it now exports 
approximately 80% of its finished products back to Germany, whereas this figure was 30-40% prior 
to independence.  However, this may reflect a drop in the total amount produced, rather than a 
drastic increase in demand in Germany.  Italy and Austria are also large markets for INAS-TAS 
products, and there is some business in Eastern European countries as well.  The firm retains good 
connections in Russia, but their poor economic conditions creates little demand.  Currently there is 
a small market for INAS-TAS’s products in Bosnia and Macedonia, but, again, their struggling 
economies limits their ability to purchase. 
 
The number of INAS-TAS employees has shrunk from 2,500 to 250 as a result of declining 
demand for its products in the former Yugoslav republics and Eastern Europe.  Šavora believed that 
many former employees were able to find other jobs or retired, but that many more remain 
unemployed.  He also noted that many of the more skilled staff went abroad to find better jobs, 
further contributing to the brain drain.    
   60
  Šavora did not believe that easing trade barriers with Serbia was an optimal government 
policy, but that better relations would progress slowly.  He also did not think that CEFTA would 
have particular advantages for INAS-TAS since it has already concentrated so much of its market 
in Western Europe.  While INAS-TAS does do some business in CEFTA countries, he does not 
think joining CEFTA would improve his market share or have much impact except to perhaps 
facilitate connections or cut paperwork.  The most useful government policies for INAS-TAS, 
Šavora believed to have already been enacted.  The previous monetary policy favored imports, but 
made exported Croatian products expensive.  He was optimistic that current government efforts 
would improve this situation and be more supportive of production for export.      
 
  Before 1991  2001 
# Employees  2,500 250 
Source of inputs  Germany Germany 
Source of labor  Croats Croats 
Markets for 
goods/services 
Other Yugoslav republics, 
Eastern Europe and 
Germany (30-40%) 
Germany (80%), Italy, 
Austria, little in Bosnia, 




Kraš was the largest confectionery in Yugoslavia, and remains the largest and most reputable 
manufacturer of confectionery products in Southeast Europe.  Founded in 1911, the firm has built 
up its tradition based on the high quality of its products.  The company is based in Zagreb, but 
previously also had a factory in the Serbian-dominated part of Bosnia, as well as many stores 
throughout the former Yugoslavia.  This additional factory was subsequently lost during the 
conflict, as were many stores.  The company was built to serve the Yugoslav market of 22 million 
people and has consequently suffered greatly due to the loss of the former markets.  In the 1980s 
their output was around 50,000 tons a year, but it is currently half that—24,000 to 25,000 tons a 
year.   
 
With Yugoslav disintegration in 1991, the firm had the capacity and workforce, but was left 
with no substantial market to serve.  While Kraš was able to export to Slovenia easily, the other 
markets have proved more difficult to re-enter.  There is some demand in Bosnia, but the 
purchasing power of people there is very low, so the firm must offer the products at a reduced 
price.  As a result, some people were re-importing the products into Croatia from Bosnia at this 
lower price.  With the dramatic decrease in their domestic market resulting from disintegration, 
Kraš refocused its attentions to the markets in surrounding Western European countries, as well as 
Australia and the United States, which also have sizeable Croatian populations.  However, entering   61
these new markets creates large costs because of the need to promote brand recognition through 
expensive marketing.  This is particularly important since confectionery is a cultural good, which 
make brands the most significant factor. Kraš’s efforts to enter the U.S. and Australian markets 
reveals their intention of capitalizing on the existent recognition of émigrés.  They even created 
products specifically for this market and for souvenirs, such as the Croatian chocolate passport and 
boxes of chocolates saying “Pozdrav iz Hrvatska” (“greetings from Croatia).  Re-entering the 
markets of the former Yugoslav republics does not create the need for brand introduction, since 
Kraš is well known there.  Improved access to these markets would therefore be desirable.  Further, 
increased purchasing power with hoped-for economic growth in the other former Yugoslav 
republics would also increase sales and profits for Kraš. 
 
 Damir  Žderić, sales and marketing coordinator for Kraš, noted the difficulty of competing 
with much larger foreign firms that are much stronger financially.  For this reason, he also does not 
want Croatia to join CEFTA or other trade agreements yet.  Kraš now only has 70% of the Croatian 
market due to increased competition from abroad and the firm does not want its share to drop 
further due to increasing economic openness.  Kraš is still rather uncompetitive because it is not yet 
producing to capacity and maintains superfluous workers because it does not want to contribute to 
further unemployment in Zagreb.  Kraš has cut back its workforce drastically in an effort to 
restructure and become more competitive, yet the commitment to the community and worker 
welfare brought about in the socialist era still linger.  After the privatization process, workers still 
own 72% of the company.  While the provision of jobs does aid the local economy, the firm is hurt 
by these inefficient policies and less able to compete in foreign or the domestic market. 
 
Žderić did not believe that any other government policies could help the firm.  Instead, he 
believes that the firm will become increasingly competitive on its own over time as it further 
adjusts to the market economy.  Essentially, he indicated that he wanted access to new markets and 
the former republics, but not the increased competition from general economic openness. 
 
  Before 1991     2001 
# Employees  5,000 2,000 
Source of inputs   Mainly Croatia, though 
some necessary imports 
(i.e. Cacao from Africa) 
mainly Croatia, though some 
necessary imports (i.e. Cacao 
from Africa) 
Source of labor    Croats (local at other 
stores or factory)  
Croats (local at other stores) 
Markets for 
goods/services 
99% for Yugoslav market, 
other for Eastern Europe 
70% for Croatia, export to 
mainly Eastern Europe, some 
to EU, USA and Australia 
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TEHNIKA 
Tehnika is a Zagreb-based firm that provides design, civil engineering and construction services.  It 
was founded in 1947 and has consequently undergone many transformations as the economic 
situation and system in the nation have changed.  The company had social ownership, like all 
Yugoslav firms, until the free market reforms that independent Croatia enacted.  However, the 
employees still own a considerable portion of the company, a policy that is widely believed in 
Croatia, and elsewhere, to encourage motivation.  (However, many other studies have indicated that 
it promotes inefficient firm behavior, exacerbating uncomepetiveness.)  Nenad Koritnik, the 
assistant general manager of Tehnika, noted that before this monumental change the primary 
objective of the company was to find work for all the employees.  Profits were invested in 
improving the company (equipment, etc.) and were used to give additional benefits to the 
employees.  (Tehnika continues to purchase their equipment from Germany, due to their links of 35 
years and the high quality of the machinery available there.)  After the transition to capitalism, the 
company became increasingly profit-oriented and there was a great deal of organizational 
restructuring entailing many changes in the management.   
 
  The disintegration of Yugoslavia has deteriorated business conditions for Tehnika 
markedly.  Before 1991, Tehnika completed numerous projects within the other Yugoslav 
republics, although the majority of their work was done in Croatia.  Within Croatia, Tehnika mostly 
built apartment buildings and industrial complexes.  The other republics also had good construction 
companies to meet their local needs, but there was demand for Tehnika’s more specialized services, 
particularly in the food industry, such as silos and slaughterhouses.  When working in the other 
republics, Tehnika often hired local unskilled labor and brought in Croatian managers, technical 
experts and other employees, depending on the situation.  The same was true of their projects 
abroad, which often had a local partner.  In 1985, Tehnika had approximately 4,500 employees, but 
this figure dropped to 1,500 in 2001.  This drastic workforce reduction resulted gradually, 
according to Koritnik, as the number of projects decreased.  The projects in the republics were 
stopped and those in Western Europe slowed, decreasing demand for labor.  In addition, many 
ethnically Bosnian laborers and nationals of other countries who were working in Croatia were not 
eligible for Croatian citizenship and were forced to leave.  He also explained that many workers 
have retired or left for better-paying jobs and that they have not hired replacements.  (Early 
retirement was often the manner of laying off surplus workforce.  This has resulted in additional   
pressure on the budget and higher taxes.  Early retirement plans also put people out of the 
workforce who could still be very productive.)   63
 
There were many factors causing the recent decline in business for Tehnika.  The erection of 
new political borders played a primary role in this decrease.  The conflict has left considerable 
prejudice between the groups, which has effectively created psychological borders, making it more 
difficult to do business within the other republics even if free trade agreements are put in place.   
Tehnika has also decreased the number of projects in Western Europe due to changes in the 
European Union, which makes it more cost effective to hire labor from Portugal or East Germany.  
Further, increased pension payments in Germany due to EU policies have made work there too 
expensive and the firm unable to bid competitively.  The economic turmoil in Russia has decreased 
demand for Tehnika’s services there.  In addition, the economic conditions in Croatia greatly 
inhibit firms from accessing sufficient financing at reasonable rates to successfully bid on projects.  
Koritnik cited the high cost of capital as the largest obstacle facing his firm.  He noted that war was 
not the biggest obstacle to the firm, but the lack of investment that resulted from the economic 
crisis.  Koritnik believes that the government could best help his company by creating a better 
climate for investment.  He argued that, as the economy as a whole grows, there will be increased 
demand for Tehnika’s services.  He did not think that free trade agreements with the other republics 
were necessary right now, but instead believes that these opportunities will come with time and that 
it was more important to first rebuild the local economy.   
 
  Before 1991  2001 
# Employees  4,500 1,500   
Source of inputs  Mainly Germany  Mainly Germany 
Source of labor  Mixture of Croats and local 
labor 
all Croats for domestic 
projects, some local labor at 
few foreign sites. 
Markets for 
goods/services 
Mainly Croatia, but some 
projects in other republics and 
abroad (Russia, Germany, 
Algeria) 
no projects in other republics, 
very few in other countries 
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APPENDIX  C:_  PRONUNCIATION  GUIDE         
 
I used many of the Croatian spellings for people and places to keep them as accurate as possible.  
Here is a rough pronunciation guide highlighting the major differences to assist non-Croatian 
speakers. 
 
c  like the “ts” in cats 
ć  like the “ch” in cheese 
č  like the “ch” in chalk 
đ  like the “j” in jug 
g  like the “g” in god 
j  like the “y” in yellow 
š  like the “sh” in sheep 
ž  like the “s” in pleasure 
 
 